
Rhodesian Mail During the Bush War 1973 - 1980

A philatelic presentation



by Mike Hughes



Ceasefire monitors with liaison officers of the Patriotic Front at one of the assembly points.

Front Cover

An aerogramme postmarked Salisbury 26 FEB 1980. It is endorsed with a cachet of the P. F. MILITARY H. Q. (ZIPRA) contingent of THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION.

The cachet correctly describes the country as SOUTHERN RHODESIA.
On 12th December 1979, the country reverted to the status of a colony called Southern Rhodesia.

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References

- 1) P.T.C. letter from the Postmaster General dated 23 May 1980 addressed to Chris Munnion, which lists the post office and postal agencies that were closed as a direct result of the bush war.
- 2) South of the Zambesi by Hal Hoyte and Jane Lashbrook for the location of incidents and the coding used to describe postmark types.
- 3) The Postmarks of Rhodesia 1888 1980 by Jon and Jenifer Barry.
- 4) The confusing tale of too many Gwaais by Rob Burrett RSCJ 284 52/57.
- 5) The Rhodesian War. A Military History by Paul Moorcraft & Peter McLaughlin
- 6) Undated paper written by Cecil Russell, provided on request by Michael Deverell (www.rhodesia.co.za) entitled 'Military Post Office Service : Rhodesia Army'
- 7) "Operation Overload Chiweshe. The construction of the first group of protected villages".
- A personal account written by Nick Baalbergen appearing on the website "Rhodesia's Intaf" @https://dudleywall.webs.com/
- 8) The Rhodesian Forces Website @ https://rhodesianforces.org/
- 9) Wikipedia.org
- 10) Patrick Stidolph. His personal account of a callup during 1979 when he was posted to the Bveke Protected Sub Office. Personal emails in 2023.
- 11) Anthony Stidolph, his blog "STIDY'S EYE: SOLDIERING ON.." (https://stidyseye.home.blog/2022/03/26/soldiering-on/) and personal photographs of Assembly Point Alpha provided by email in 2023).

Abbreviations

The English versions are used

ANC African National Congress (South Africa)

ANC African National Council (Rhodesia) Internal political party, Muzorewa

British South Africa Police **BSAP**

CIO Central Intelligence Organisation **COMOPS** Combined Operations HQ, Salisbury

District Assistant DA DC District Commissioner FAF Forward Airfield

FPLM FRELIMO's military wing

Mozambique Liberation Front **FRELIMO** Mozambiguan political party Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe **FROLIZI** Splinter grouping 1971-1974

JOC Joint Operations Command

MNR See RENAMO

MTO Money Order and Telegraph Office Post office employing postal staff

OAU Organisation of African Unity

PA Postal agency Conducts simple postal business Patriotic Front Political alliance of ZANU and ZAPU PF PF-ZAPU Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African Peoples Union ZAPU after merging with ZANU

PO Post Office

PSO Protected Sub-Office

P.T.C. Posts and Telecommunications Corporation A parastatal formed in 1970; the

Postal Administration in Rhodesia

PVs Protected Villages

Mozambique National Resistance **RENAMO** Mozambiguan opposition front RF Rhodesian Front Political party led by Ian Smith

SADF South African Defence Force

SAP South African Police TTL Tribal Trust Land

UANC United African National Congress Coalition of all parties 1974-1975 Declared on 11th November 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence UDI **UNITA** National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola Angolan political party & military

Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU's military wing **ZANLA**

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union Shona (Mugabe) political party ZANU after merging with ZAPU

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union Matabele (Nkomo) political party ZIPA Zimbabwe People's Army Temporary coalition of ZIPRA & ZANLA

ZIPRA Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army ZAPU's military wing

Zimbabwe Liberation Council ZLC

Preface

Coming at the start of the decolonisation period, the Federation of self-governing Southern Rhodesia with two directly ruled British protectorates was later described by the British historian Robert Blake as "an aberration of history - a curious deviation from the inevitable course of events". The Federal project faced black opposition from the start, and ultimately failed because of shifting international attitudes and the rising black African ambitions of the late 1950s and early 1960s. These aspirations are often collectively referred to as the Wind of Change, a term made famous by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in a speech to the South African Parliament in Cape Town on 3rd February 1960. It was the inability of the British and Rhodesian governments to agree a formula leading to independence for Rhodesia following the dissolution of the Federation on 31st December 1963 that resulted in Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.

The tragedy that unfolded as black Rhodesian nationalists fought white Rhodesian nationalists for power in a civil war that came to be known as the Bush War, resulted in much misery and death and had many social and economic consequences, affecting all Rhodesian citizens. The bush war 'proper' is regarded as having started on 21st December 1972 when forces of the ZANLA guerrillas attacked the Altena farm in the Centenary farmlands, and continued with increasing intensity until a ceasefire was signed in London exactly seven years later to the day on 21st December 1979.

I was a territorial soldier in 5th Battalion Rhodesia Regiment, serving in various roles, for the duration of the period under review and was presented with my Long Service Medal at 2 Brigade Headquarters, Cranborne Barracks in 1979. While reviewing my description of how the bush war unfolded, I have been surprised at how unaware I was about the overall picture at the time – the ebb and flow of battle, the number and size of the guerrilla forces, the rise and function of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government's auxiliaries, the degree to which 'white' units like the Rhodesia Regiment Independent Companies had been bolstered with black recruits, or the levels of white emigration. We all had relatives, friends and workmates who were emigrating but the scale was not apparent. Those emigrating were said to be 'taking the gap' or 'joining the chicken run' by those remaining. International sanctions resulted in a continual shortage of foreign currency, so many commodities were in short supply. We became accustomed to petrol rationing. Importantly however, the country was able to feed itself.

In order to provide the background to better understand the context of the many illustrations of the forces' mails during this period and the environment in which the PTC was operating, I have written what I hope will be read as an impartial description of why the bush war began and how it unfolded, leading eventually to the country achieving its independence as Zimbabwe. Philatelic material has been used to highlight and amplify the events and consequences of the war where relevant. This is not a military treatise, rather an overview of the warring parties and their politics, both internal and international, which explain the decisions leading to the events on the ground.

Two features of Rhodesia's mail during the bush war stand out: -

- The volume of Forces Mail. Illustrations have been selected to represent a wide cross section of the Rhodesian security forces. Text has been added to try to explain the relevance and functions of each branch or unit.
- The second feature, less visible, was the extent and impact of the challenge facing the Post Office in maintaining postal services, particularly in operational areas. Although numerous postal agencies closed, many others remained open, or even re-opened, despite the threats and danger to staff operating those offices and the difficulties of transporting mail to and from offices located away from the line of rail and the main roads. Several of the postmarks used to illustrate these offices relate to small agencies that were not long in existence and closed prematurely, making them difficult to find.

Mike Hughes July 2023

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The Bush War

Part 1 The Bush War 1964 to 1976

1.1 Significant events during this period

31 December 1963 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved

Federal assets including the railways, airline and the military were split up and

divided between the three countries

6 July 1964 Nyasaland gained independence as Malawi

24 October 1964 Northern Rhodesia gained independence as Zambia and Southern Rhodesia de

facto changed its name to simply Rhodesia

11 November 1965 Rhodesia made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

12 November 1965 United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 216 calling for non-recognition

and subsequently followed with full mandatory sanctions

12 November 1965 Britain imposed total economic sanctions, followed by an oil embargo on the 17th

28 April 1966 The first armed confrontation near Sinoia

2 March 1970 Rhodesia's republican constitution came into effect

21 December 1972 Attack on Altena farm near Centenary, regarded as the start of the bush war 'proper'

9 January 1973 Rhodesia closed the land border with Zambia

4 February 1973 Rhodesia reversed the border closure but the Zambian side remained closed

25 April 1974 Military coup in Portugal

25 June 1975 Mozambique gained independence from Portugal under a FRELIMO government

11 November 1975 The 10th anniversary of UDI

3 March 1976 Mozambique closed the border with Rhodesia to all traffic 14 September 1976 Smith conceded the principle of majority rule in two years




Figure 1.1 Commemorative cover signed by Ian Smith.

11th November 1965, that fateful day. Many regard this political act of defiance as the statement of intent which set the course of events in Rhodesia over the following fifteen years, leading to independence for Zimbabwe on 18th April 1980.

1.2 How the bush war developed

The independence of Malawi and Zambia led to increased demands for the independence of Southern Rhodesia, by both the whites and the black nationalists who had started to send men for military training – ZAPU in 1962 to China (the Zimbabwe African People's Union, Joshua Nkomo's Matabele political party) and ZANU in 1963 to Russia (the Zimbabwe African National Union, Robert Mugabe's Shona political party). UDI gave a fresh impetus and a colour of legitimacy to guerrilla activity. Sporadic guerrilla attacks began in April 1966. In August 1967 a group of 90 guerrillas, half of them from South Africa, entered the country east of Victoria Falls. Operation Cauldron ensued in which many of the group were killed or captured but which also resulted in the deaths of eight members of the Rhodesian security forces. Thereafter, guerrillas avoided direct contact with Rhodesian security forces, seeking easier ways of crossing into Rhodesia. However, this incident brought South Africa into the conflict. About 2 000 South African Police were despatched to assist with border control, "to prevent incursions by South African guerrillas from crossing the Zambesi River into Rhodesia".

In March 1968 a further large-scale crossing took place in the Zambezi Valley along the Chewoi River. 123 guerrilla fighters of the same affiliation, nearly half ZAPU, half ANC (African National Congress, South Africa), crossed the Zambesi. Within a matter of weeks most had been killed or captured with the remnants fleeing back across the Zambezi. Again, this operation had important consequences because Prime Minister Vorster authorised further contingents of South African policemen to be sent to assist Rhodesia, increasing their number to around 2 700.




Figure 1.2 Forces Mail letter posted at Chirundu 31 OCT 1972 by a member of South African Police unit X RAY 21 that was based at the Chirundu Police Post.

The date is shortly before the border with Zambia was closed.

From 1970 until 1976 ZAPU played no part in the bush war. They were in a state of disarray having suffered severe defeats within Rhodesia. Instead, they sent their commanders and fighters on extended training courses to Russia, Cuba and North Korea.

At this time, there was increasing Chinese Communist influence with ZANU and a number of ZANLA commanders spent long periods in Peking undergoing training. The most significant development was that ZANLA learnt the lessons of Mao Tse Tung namely, that it was pointless to operate in remote areas without the support of the local population. They learnt the true art of guerrilla warfare, namely, 'to move amongst the people like fish in water'.

During 1971 ZANLA started to put its new operating policy into effect but on a very small scale. They started infiltrating the north-east of Rhodesia through Mozambique. This area was predominantly occupied by the Kore Kore people who had always been anit-administration. The area was remote and administered by a very small government staff. During the rainy seasons, the administrators could not travel to the remote parts and therefore the area was ideal for the guerrillas to establish themselves.



Figure 1.3 A diagram that illustrates the extent of the various Rhodesian bush war operational zones.

This diagrammatic map also shows when each zone became operational and which combatants were active in each zone. It is noteworthy that HURRICANE was established during the last few days of 1972 and that it was not until 1976 that the operational zones were extended – and then to cover the whole of the eastern, south eastern and western borders of the country, marking a very rapid escalation of hostilities. In collaboration with the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, a Military Post Office was established in Salisbury in February 1974 to service the Op. Hurricane zone so that mail could be delivered to territorial members of the army deployed in the field. The MPO was extended as the area of hostilities widened.

By 1972 the Portuguese were beginning to lose control of the Tete Pedicle and FRELIMO started to operate against the Portuguese with a degree of impunity. Because of tribal groupings, FRELIMO were sympathetic towards ZANU and started to give ZANLA assistance in moving through Mozambique into Rhodesia.

Now that ZANLA had secured bases south of the Zambesi River, they began to cross the Zambesi valley

and escarpment to gain access to the unprotected white farmlands. This provoked attacks into Mozambique by the Rhodesians but after 12 months of 'winning hearts and minds', often inflicting brutal public beatings on those refusing to cooperate, and using locals to porter in weapons and supplies to establish caches within Rhodesia, ZANLA resumed operations in late 1972.

The attack on the Altena farm near Centenary on 21st December 1972 is generally taken as the start of the bush war 'proper'. Within a matter of weeks, more farm attacks took place and more and more guerrillas entered Rhodesia in the north-eastern area. To contain this increased threat, Operation Hurricane was immediately set up and for three years the war was largely confined to the north-east of the country within the Op. Hurricane zone.




Figure 1.4 A poster issued by the BSAP following the increased level of attacks on isolated farms and homesteads.

Rhodesia closed the land border with Zambia, except for copper exports, on 9 January 1973, stating that it would remain closed until Zambia ceased harbouring guerrillas. Both South Africa and Portugal were incensed because they wished to use Zambian exports through Maputo and South African ports as leverage to induce Zambian moderation. Although Rhodesia reopened the border a month later on 4 February 1973, the Zambian side remained closed and Rhodesia had to contend with another front along the entire Zambian border. This border closure did not affect postal services with Zambia which continued uninterrupted using airmail.

Hostilities continued to intensify in the Op. Hurricane zone. July 1973 saw the first major abduction of schoolchildren from St Alberts Mission on the Zambesi escarpment beyond Centenary, when guerrillas abducted 295 pupils and staff, most of whom were subsequently returned. Security forces held community meetings with tribal leaders, warning of the consequences of continued support for the insurgents. Selective punitive measures were employed: collective fines were imposed, cattle impounded, shops, clinics, schools, churches, grain mills and other facilities closed.

The need to regain control quickly and decisively became both a political and military imperative, and so in June 1974 the first protected village programme was implemented in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, just 40 miles north of Salisbury. It was bounded on three sides by white farmlands. In 'Operation Overload' more than 45 000 rural Africans with their belongings were relocated into 21 newly constructed protected villages. The security forces immediately set about a similar operation called Overload Two in the Madziwa TTL, east of Chiweshe. This involved relocating 13,500 civilians into eight protected villages. These were replicated from Centenary in the north to Melsetter and Chipinga in the east. During

the following two years an estimated 240 000 rural Africans were relocated into protected or consolidated villages. Curfews, 'no-go' areas and 'free-fire' zones were implemented. Although these measures embittered the local populations, they also seriously hampered movement and denied guerrilla fighters a source of food, intelligence and recruits, prompting ZANLA to resort to abductions to recruit followers. By being able to concentrate the country's entire resources to a relatively small area of Rhodesia, it was possible to have large force levels deployed, to improve the communication network and to construct excellent airfields. With the assistance of the South African Police who were mainly engaged in border control along the Zambezi River, but with a number also involved in active operations, the kill rate increased considerably.

April 1974 saw the coup in Portugal take place and the Portuguese war effort in its three African provinces collapsed. Although this event had no immediate impact on Rhodesia it had a major influence on the thinking of the Vorster government which had adopted an 'outward policy' of détente with black Africa and was striving to manage the emerging Mozambique situation. It now planned for a moderate and pliant black regime to replace Smith rather than what they anticipated could be a long war which could result in a hardline Marxist regime instead.



Figure 1.5 FIGHT TERRORISM / JOIN THE ARMY
This machine cancellation slogan was used by four offices —
Salisbury, Bulawayo, Gwelo and Que Que.
It has only been seen used during November 1974 in each office.
This was the first occasion that a machine cancellation had used a political slogan.

South Africa (encouraged by the United States of America and Britain) and Zambia (where Kaunda was tired to the rival nationalist parties fighting each other in his country and whose economy was being destroyed by the war) were in secret talks to force a compromise in Rhodesia and on 11 December 1974 both Prime Minister Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Chairman of a hurried and uneasy coalition of the nationalists under the banner UANC signed in Lusaka on 9 December 1974, were forced to accept a ceasefire. In terms of this ceasefire, the Rhodesian Government was to release a number of senior black political detainees, including Mugabe and Nkomo, and South Africa undertook to remove South African forces from Rhodesia. Even so, in October and November of 1974 alone, more guerrillas had been killed than had been killed in the whole period from 1972 to September 1974, so that by 11th December 1974 it was estimated by Rhodesian intelligence that there were only between 70 to 100 hardcore guerrilla fighters left within Rhodesia.

Following intense pressure from Zambia, the four nationalist parties, ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and ANC (African National Council, Muzorewa), signed an agreement in Lusaka on 9th December 1974 to combine under the title UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the ANC, was selected to be the Chairman and representative of the UANC. Muzorewa and Smith, who was given no alternative by the South Africans, signed a ceasefire agreement on 11th December 1974.




Figure 1.6 This poster, explaining the terms of the ceasefire to guerrillas who very possibly had not received news of the ceasefire, was circulated by the Rhodesian government.

However, both sides accused the other of not honouring the terms of the ceasefire and the call to lay down arms was largely ignored.

The ceasefire did not work: the Rhodesians pulled back only some of their forward groups and failed to release all the detainees while the guerrillas continued to infiltrate. Despite this failure, and in the face of anger from Salisbury, South Africa announced on 11 February 1975 that SA police had been removed from their forward positions. Mozambique gained independence from Portugal on 25 June 1975. On 1 August 1975 South Africa announced that all the SA police had been withdrawn from Rhodesia (although secretly, more than 50 helicopter pilots and mechanics remained to run the vital chopper force). Then, on 25 August 1975, under the watchful eyes of Vorster and Kaunda, Smith and Muzorewa, the Chairman of the UANC, held the famous conference in a South African railway carriage in the middle of the Victoria Falls bridge which ended in deadlock.




Figure 1.7 On 1 August 1975 South Africa had announced that all the SA police had been withdrawn from Rhodesia (although secretly, more than 50 helicopter pilots and mechanics remained to run the vital chopper force). Then, on 25 August 1975, under the watchful eyes of Vorster and Kaunda, Smith and Muzorewa, the Chairman of the UANC, held the famous conference in a South African railway carriage in the middle of the Victoria Falls bridge which ended in deadlock.

However, 1975 was not a good year for the nationalists. Political infighting between the different nationalist parties in Lusaka resulted in a lack of support for those in the field, leading to the ZANLA sectorial commanders within Rhodesia becoming disillusioned with the conduct of the war. They returned to Lusaka to demand better conditions. There followed political turmoil amongst the nationalist factions, with executions and assassinations of top leaders including the ZANLA leader Herbert Chitepo in March 1975. Finally, Zambian pressures forced ZANLA to flee to Mozambique leaving Zambia the sole stamping ground for Nkomo's ZAPU and it's ZIPRA troops.

The emasculation of the ZANU leadership had further disrupted the logistics network supplying fighters in the field in Rhodesia. Less experienced combat commanders soon fell victim to increased security force activity and ZANLA morale sagged while their casualty rate rocketed. At the end of 1975 Rhodesian intelligence reported that only 3 active groups of guerrillas were still operating within the country.

ZANLA now had only a shaky base in Mozambique and was no longer trusted by FRELIMO, so the idea of a '3rd force' evolved, to coordinate the military wings of the main political parties and bypass the politicians. This resulted in the formation of ZIPA, the Zimbabwe People's Army. However, by the end of 1976 political infighting within ZIPA led to the demise of that alliance; ZIPRA elements returned to Zambia and ZANLA elements re-joined the ZANLA forces in Mozambique.

Four days after a Rhodesian air force attack into Mozambique on 23 February 1976 the FRELIMO government retaliated by seizing two Rhodesian train crews. Rhodesia responded by halting all rail traffic through to Maputo. In response Machel cut all links with Rhodesia on 3 March 1976 and implemented full United Nations sanctions, resulting in Rhodesia becoming reliant on the remaining two rail links through South Africa, the direct line through Beit Bridge, the other through Botswana, a leverage Pretoria would soon employ. The Mozambique border remained closed to all traffic until Zimbabwe had gained independence on 18 April 1980.



Figure 1.8 Mozambique cut all links with Rhodesia on 3 March 1976 and implemented full United Nations sanctions. Although the border between Rhodesia and Mozambique was closed, there is no record that any specific action was taken to prevent postal services continuing, and it seems quite probable that after a delay of a few weeks, mail deliveries resumed, routed through South Africa.

Although only temporary alliance, ZIPA had revitalised the campaign. It launched a fresh offensive into Rhodesia in January 1976 where it concentrated on mobilising the masses. It adopted a strategy of sabotage in Manicaland and spread guerrilla warfare southwards. In February 1976 Operation Thrasher, based in Umtali, was established to monitor the eastern border and in May 1976 Operation Repulse, with its HQ in Fort Victoria, was set up to counter guerrilla activity in the south-eastern lowveld. Following the deaths of four South African tourists during a main road ambush that took place between Beit Bridge and Fort Victoria in the south-east lowveld, protected civilian convoys were introduced between the main centres

At the same time, ZAPU had been told in no uncertain fashion by the OAU Liberation Committee that unless they took a more active role in the war they would be cut off from all sources of funds. As a result, ZIPRA groups began infiltrating across the Zambezi and south along the border with Botswana. The 'revival' of ZIPRA activities brought about a massive upswing in recruits. This resulted to Operation TANGENT being opened along Rhodesia's western border with Botswana in August 1976. Incursions into Rhodesia continued to increase as did Rhodesian 'externals' into Mozambique. A particularly violent external attack on 9 August 1976 code-named Operation Eland, on a large guerrilla base at Nyadzonya, only 25 miles north-east of Umtali, resulted in over 1 000 guerrillas and trainees being killed. This so angered Vorster that the 50 plus helicopter pilots, mechanics and liaison officers that had been left in Rhodesia in August 1975 when all SA police were withdrawn, were immediately withdrawn, followed by delays in rail deliveries of petrol and armaments.

Finally, Pretoria announced that South Africa supported the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia. Politically Vorster had pulled the rug from under Smith. Under pressure from Kissinger, Vorster confronted Smith: agree to majority rule or we will cut off your supplies. In a televised address on 24 September 1976 Smith conceded the principle of majority rule in two years and in meetings between Smith, Vorster and Kissinger, a 'Kissinger plan' was developed.

A conference to discuss the mechanics of a rapid transition to majority rule was organised in Geneva. For this purpose ZANU and ZAPU, the political parties led by Nkomo and Mugabe, agreed to form an alliance, the Patriotic Front, to speak on their behalf. Both parties continued to function but with the prefix/suffix 'PF' added to the names. This alliance was inherently unstable and did not extend to their military organisations. The most significant outcome was that the Patriotic Front alliance was recognised as the authentic liberation movement by the United Nations and by the Liberation Committee of the OAU which threatened to cut off funds from the PF unless it maintained a unified ZANU – ZAPU front.




Figure 1.9 On 28 October 1976 the Geneva Conference opened to negotiate the Kissinger Plan. It ended on 14 December 1976 without a result. However, in the eyes of the British and American Governments the Patriotic Front had become the "force to be negotiated with".

On 28 October 1976 the Geneva Conference opened to negotiate the Kissinger Plan, under the chairmanship of Mr Ivor Richard. Delegations representing the Rhodesia Front (led by Smith) and the nationalist movements (led by Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Mugabe) attended. Neighbouring countries involved in the bush war sent observers. However, the nationalists were not prepared to negotiate on the basis of the five points accepted by Smith and the conference ended on 14 December 1976 without a result. However, in the eyes of the British and American Governments. the Patriotic Front had become the "force to be negotiated with".

Although South Africa now loosened its armlock on Rhodesia so that Salisbury would receive sufficient arms to hold off the guerrillas until a settlement could be reached, the clear aim of the bush war, which was to prevent black rule, had been abandoned and morale in the army slumped.



Figure 1.10a The one page pamphlet is folded vertically through the centre. The above image shows the front and back pages.

The two centre pages when spread out as illustrated on the next page describe 'what you are fighting for'.



Figure 1.10b Following Smith's broadcast in September 1976 which conceded the principle of majority rule within two years, the clear aim of the bush war, which was to prevent black rule, had been abandoned. Morale in the army slumped and number of whites leaving the country continued to increase. However, Smith remained determined that majority rule would be negotiated on his terms.

Until 1972 the guerrillas had managed to apply pinpricks to white rule. During the 4-year period 1973 to 1976 there was a lot of African political mobilisation, particularly in Mashonaland, but the Rhodesian government, with the reluctant and erratic support of South Africa, had managed to contain the burgeoning conflict. During the following three years 1977 to 1979, the bush war would grow to engulf the whole country and destroy the government's resolve to fight on.

Armed convoys between towns were implemented in 1976.



Figure 1.11 A convoy assembling at Beatrice in preparation for the drive to Beit Bridge.
Civilian convoys were implemented in mid-1976 after four South African tourists
on motor cycles were ambushed and killed near Nuanetsi.

An armed Police Reserve vehicle led the convoy which could spread out over several miles,
another brought up the rear with a third moving up and down the convoy.



Figure 1.12 Family photograph, going on holiday in September 1979. Waiting for the convoy to set off from Beatrice on our way to Beit Bridge. Extra petrol coupons were granted on application for events such as this but only as far as the border. On the return trip it was essential to fill the car in Messina as no ration coupons were issued to cover the return part of the journey.

2 The Bush War 1977 to 1980

2.1 Significant events during this period

1 September 1977	Conference to negotiate majority rule based on Anglo-American proposals
3 March 1978	Internal Settlement reached with the UANC which was rejected by the Patriotic
	Front and later by the United Nations and Britain
10 September 1978	Martial law declared in certain areas and ZANU and ZAPU banned
19 October 1978	Rhodesia took over control of Zambian airspace temporarily - the famous 'Green
	Leader' incident
17 to 21 April 1979	Zimbabwe Rhodesia elections, boycotted by ZANU and ZAPU
1 June 1979	The new Zimbabwe Rhodesia constitution came into effect
10 September 1979	Opening of the Lancaster House Conference in London
12 December 1979	The end of UDI. The British Governor, Lord Soames, arrived in Salisbury and
	established Direct Rule over Southern Rhodesia and lifted all sanctions.
21 December 1979	Ceasefire Agreement signed in London
27 to 29 Feb 1980	Elections supervised by Lord Soames for the first Zimbabwe Government
18 April 1980	Zimbabwe gained its Independence

2.2 How the bush war developed

Following the debacle of the Geneva Conference that ended without result on 14 December 1976, the Rhodesian government concentrated on finding an 'internal solution' for the road to African majority rule and South Africa continued to provide arms for externals in order to 'buy time' for negotiations with moderate African leaders.

In March 1977 a Combined Operations HQ was formed with headquarters adjacent to the Prime Minister's office to better coordinate the war effort. In April, the maximum callup for conscripts under the age of 38 was increased to 190 days a year, conscription was extended to whites aged 38 to 50 and those aged over 50 were asked to volunteer for police duties. The number of black soldiers – all volunteers – was increased by the addition of a 3rd battalion Rhodesian African Rifles. The Protected Village programme was stepped up in all operational areas so that by August 1977 there were over 200 PVs reaching all the way down the eastern border as far south as Beit Bridge, accommodating more than 500 000 people.

The Patriotic Front was not interested in negotiating an end to the war and continued to intensify its offensive, supported to an increasing extent by the governments of Mozambique and Zambia. By April 1977 there were an estimated 500 guerrillas in Hurricane, 1 000 in Thrasher, 650 in Repulse and 200 in Tangent. In August 1977 Op Grapple was opened in the central area of Rhodesia. As the number of guerrillas increased, so did the extent of their penetration, resulting in the growing disruption of government infrastructure, forcible closure of schools, clinics and mission stations, stock theft and attacks on white farms. African councils in the rural areas could not function and local council buildings were looted and burnt. In August a bomb was placed in a store in central Salisbury resulting in 11 deaths and more than 70 injuries. With thoughts of a possible election in the future, both factions sort to ensure that the maximum number of tribal lands, and thereby the inhabitants, came under their influence and not that of the opposing faction. This resulted in ZANLA pushing west as far as they could possibly go with ZIPRA reacting by trying to move as far east as possible. Contact between the forces occurred from time to time, escalating the threat of a civil war.

But then South Africa again changed tack. For a number of political reasons, including a need to project a strong image at home in response to a right wing challenge ahead of their general election in November 1977, the Vorster government began to support the internal settlement plan in Rhodesia. With renewed South African support, massive attacks involving both ground troops and the Rhodesian Air Force were mounted against ZANLA camps in Mozambique, some more than 200 kms from the Rhodesian border, and even government infrastructure, particularly bridges, was targeted to deny ZANLA vehicular access to the Rhodesian border. Efforts were also made to destabilise the states that harboured the guerrilla forces. The MNR, later called RENAMO, was created by the Rhodesian CIO, trained at a RENAMO camp at Odzi, and supported by Rhodesia and South Africa. It destabilised Mozambique with civil war from 1977 to 1992. In Zambia, local civilians were recruited for laying mines and later aiding cross-border raids. At the United Nations, Andrew Young, the American ambassador to

the UN and Dr David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, continued efforts to find a negotiated path to majority rule that would include all parties to the conflict and arranged a conference in Salisbury. The Settlement proposals were as follows: -

- An end of Mr Smith's government
- A six-month transition period leading to a general election on the basis of one-man one-vote
- The establishment of an interim government to be supervised by Britain with a UN presence including a UN Force, leading to an Independent Zimbabwe by the end of 1978
- An independence constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, protection of individual human rights, and the independence of the judiciary
- A development fund to revive the economy was also to be established

The practical steps to be followed included the appointment of a British Resident Commissioner, Field Marshall Lord Carver, whose role would be to take command of all armed forces within Rhodesia (excepting for the UN Zimbabwe Force) and to establish of a Zimbabwe National Army, to maintain law and order and to organise a general election within six months.

The Rhodesian Government particularly loathed the idea of integrating the guerrilla armies with the Rhodesian security forces during the transition period, monitored by a British Resident Commissioner and an UN-appointed military supremo, General Prem Chand.



Figure 2.1 The Anglo-American proposals, yet another attempt at finding a political solution that would bring an end to hostilities. With his options widening following renewed South African support, Smith had in effect rejected this initiative by late September 1977.




Figure 2.2 Following the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals, the Government distributed this poster in November 1977.

Eventually, on 3rd March 1978, Smith reached an accord with the most important nationalist leaders still in Rhodesia - Bishop Muzorewa, Sithole and a pliant Shona chief, Senator Chirau. These four hoped to bring about a kind of majority rule which would end the war and pre-empt a military victory by the forces of the external nationalists, the Patriotic Front. The agreement envisaged a transitional government leading to independence on 31 December 1978. In place of a Prime Minister, the Chairmanship of an Executive Council (Exco) was held on a rotating basis. On 5th March, the Patriotic Front rejected the agreement as a sham and on 6th March 1978 the United Nations Security Council debated the Salisbury Agreement and later decided that any internal settlement would be 'illegal and unacceptable'.




Figure 2.3 Commemorative cover to mark the signing of the internal settlement.

The settlement was not recognised by the main external nationalist parties, Britain and not even by South Africa. The UN Security Council passed several resolutions stating that the agreement did not represent the wishes of the African people but merely entrenched the position of the Whites.

Both Muzorewa and Sithole claimed to represent large groups of ZANLA guerrillas and promised that the war would wind down. They argued that, as majority rule was now in sight, there would no longer be a need for the guerrillas to continue to fight on. However, they were wrong and during the remainder of 1978 only a few hundred genuine guerrillas responded to the offer of amnesty and the war continued to escalate. It was perceived, correctly, that behind the rhetoric, all real power remained in white hands. Although Smith was officially excluded from the conduct of the war, in fact he worked closely with the service chiefs through his own personal council, primarily aimed at excluding the black Minister of Defence

The new administration tried to improve its image. Most political prisoners were released, bans on ZAPU and ZANU were lifted, and despite adverse military repercussions, many PVs were closed, especially in the Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudzi Operation Hurricane areas where in any case the government had lost effective control.

A late appearance in the bush war was the auxiliary army, grandly titled *Pfumo reVanhu* (Shona meaning 'the Spear of the People') which emerged from the March 3rd settlement. About \$10 million was raised, including from the anti-communist Sultan of Oman and Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to match the size of ZANLA. Ostensibly comprising guerrillas who surrendered under amnesty, as many as 90% were raw recruits, lured or press-ganged into the ranks from the urban townships, if for no other reason than to prevent them from joining the guerrillas. Some units fought well but others were merely an armed rabble. They were responsible for periodic rampages and reigns of terror inflicted on the local population in their areas of responsibility called '*frozen zones*' where Rhodesian security forces were not permitted to operate. At the same time that Muzorewa launched his amnesty programme he authorised the Rhodesian security forces to wipe out groups of mutinous auxiliaries, particularly those loyal to Sithole.






Figure 2.4 Both sides of a poster distributed by the Transitional Government following the internal settlement of March 1978, with a message inviting guerrilla forces to join Government auxiliaries.

Rhodesian Mail During the Bush War 1973 to 1980 PART 2 – THE BUSH WAR 1977 TO 1980

In preparation for the election, the transitional Rhodesian government offered amnesty to the guerrilla forces operating within the country. Posters carried this messaged: -

"TO ALL ZANLA FORCES.

In order that all the people of Zimbabwe / Rhodesia can take part in the one-man, one-vote Majority Rule Elections in April, we, the Executive Council, in a unanimous decision, have instructed the Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General G. P. Walls, G.L.M., D.C.D., M.B.E. as follows:

That any member of the ZANLA Forces who returns home in peace before the election will be well treated. They will be fed, clothed and given proper medical treatment. They will be integrated with the Interim Government Auxiliaries (Pfumo reZanhu) under the command of Combined Operations, and will be armed for this purpose. On no account will those returning members of Zanla Forces be stopped from voting in the elections in April, should they wish to do so." General Walls's statement confirms that he will carry out their instructions.

The version above was distributed in Mashonaland, where Mugabe's ZANLA forces operated, with the reverse side in Shona. A similar poster was distributed in Matabeleland where Nkomo's ZIPRA forces operated, with the reverse side in Ndebele. All four parties to the March 3rd 1978 Constitutional Agreement signed the offer.

Black doctors and apprentices were already subject to conscription. In September EXCO announced that blacks would be conscripted despite the massive problems of training them that this posed for the army. Muzorewa and Sithole had realised that they should flood the army with as many trained political followers as possible. By 1978, 80% of the armed forces were blacks who might well hold the balance in future events. Hostilities continued and by mid-June casualties reached 100 per week and increasingly violent atrocities took place. The spiralling conflict exacerbated the emigration of whites, now edging up to 1 500 a month. On 20th July a national defence levy of 12½% extra on income tax was imposed to cover a record budget deficit. There were fears that Cubans would assist ZIPRA to launch a conventional sortie into Matabeleland as there was evidence of a build-up of conventional weapons in Zambia, supplied by the Soviets. Nevertheless, Nkomo still kept back the bulk of his army. During 1978 he never deployed more than 2 000 guerrillas inside Rhodesia while 8 000 to 10 000 remained in reserve in bases in Zambia.

On 3rd September 1978 a civilian Viscount aircraft flying between Salisbury and Kariba was shot down by ZIPRA guerrillas with most of the passengers either being killed in the crash or, having survived the crash, were later massacred on the ground. A week later, Smith declared martial law in parts of the country. A massive retaliatory raid into Mozambique followed in late September. Zambia seemed to have had a reprieve and Kaunda opened the border (closed since 1973) in early October because Zambia was no longer able to use the routes through Angola and Tanzania for copper exports. Then, on 18th and 19th October, Rhodesian security forces attacked two large ZIPRA camps north of Lusaka during which the Green Leader episode took place when the Rhodesian Air Force temporarily took control of Zambian air space. By December 1978 three-quarters of Rhodesia was under martial law. There were now five armies active in the country: ZANLA, ZIPRA, the government security forces and followers of Muzorewa and of Sithole (the 'auxiliaries', increasingly becoming loyal to Muzorewa). On 11th December 1978 ZANLA forces torched the central oil storage facility in the Salisbury industrial sites and destroyed 25m gallons of fuel.

The transitional Rhodesian government entered 1979 in dire straits. ZIPRA forces were now being committed in greater numbers; ZANLA had to stop active recruitment because numbers were too large to train; the cities were being surrounded and ZIPRA and ZANLA forces were beginning to co-ordinate their strikes.

Amongst the whites, morale was plummeting. On the remaining 5 000 productive white owned farms, the wives were thrust into the front line, managing and defending their farms with the Agric-Alert radio crackling all night whilst husbands were on callup, then helping out with Women's Voluntary Services canteens at weekends. However, despite almost daily alarms and in the face of cattle thefts and crop burnings, agricultural output remained high.

Compensation bodies, such as the Terrorist Victims' Relief Fund, could not bring back the dead nor the gutted farms. The strain on families of the constant callups was evident from the rise in divorce rates, now one of the highest in the world. Families wishing to emigrate were limited to an allowance of

Z\$1 000 plus a few household effects, in spite of which white emigration was nearing 2 000 per month. Of the 1 500 whites expected to report for training at Llewellin Barracks on 10th January 1979, 415 did not show up and two days later whites aged 50 to 59 were told that they would have to serve for 42 days a year, in preparation for the coming general election.

The constitutional referendum for white voters that preceded the 'one man one vote elections' took place on 30 January 1979 resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of a black Prime Minister of a Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

In February, a second civilian Viscount was hit by a SAM-7 missile killing all 59 on board. This resulted in reprisals: the Rhodesian Air Force made a strike on a ZIPRA base in Angola, 1 000 kms from the Rhodesian border; Rhodesian special forces attacked oil depots in Zambia and Mozambique; the ZIPRA military command headquarters in Lusaka was attacked; the Kazangula ferry used daily to carry ZIPRA military supplies from Zambia into Botswana was destroyed and ZAPU men in Francistown Botswana were kidnapped and taken back to Salisbury.




Figure 2.5 For a second time a machine cancellation used a political slogan. Prior to the April 1979 elections, the slogan "WE ARE <u>ALL</u> GOING TO <u>VOTE</u>" was used by Bulawayo, Causeway and Salisbury post offices.



Figure 2.6 Salisbury used the same Shona slogan combined with a POSTAGE PAID cancellation, resulting in the slogan being red.




Figure 2.7 Another first, a machine cancellation used a slogan in the vernacular. In Salisbury, the vernacular Shona slogan read "TOSE TICHA <u>VOTA</u>".



Figure 2.8 In Bulawayo the slogan was Ndebele "SONKE SESIZAKU VOTA".

The 'one man one vote' general election was held from 18th to 21st April 1979. The external Patriotic Front announced that the elections should be boycotted and many observers anticipated that the elections would be wrecked. However, in the country's largest ever mobilisation, a 70 000- strong security force mounted a huge logistical exercise. Forces were deployed near every one of the 932 static and mobile polling stations - 18 were attacked but none closed – and Muzorewa's auxiliaries were deployed for the first time in a major supporting role in the rural areas. A contingent of about 600 British policemen were sent as observers.

Turnout was over 64% and the UANC of Bishop Muzorewa won 51 of the 72 black seats resulting in

Muzorewa becoming the country's first black Prime Minister. The Rhodesia Front party led by Smith gained all the 28 seats reserved for white voters. However, nobody recognised the Muzorewa government, not the United Nations, the OAU, Britain or even South Africa, and the Patriotic Front dismissed him as a stooge. The only tangible result of the election was an escalation of the war. This was a catastrophic setback for Muzorewa. There were now over 20 000 ZANLA forces inside the country and they had amassed a large reserve of conventional weaponry and were in no mood for compromise. At the same time, South Africa was pouring equipment, pilots and ground troops into the country.




Figure 2.9 Cover to mark the Zimbabwe Rhodesia elections in April 1979.



Figure 2.10 Map of Rhodesia showing the extent of each Operational Zone in 1979.

Bishop Muzorewa was sworn in as Prime Minister on 29th May 1979 and the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia constitution came into effect on 1st June 1979.




Figure 2.11 A historic date for those living in Rhodesia, although internationally the country was still regarded as the British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia.



Figure 2.12 Bishop Abel Muzorewa acted as a bridging force between the opposing sides and was a key political figure in bringing about the introduction of black majority rule for Zimbabwe.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in Lusaka in August, Britain persuaded fellow leaders to support an all-party conference to try to resolve the Rhodesian impasse. This led to the Lancaster House conference which opened in London on 10th September 1979.

Within days both sides escalated hostilities in an effort to gain advantage in the negotiations. Rhodesia struck at economic targets in both Zambia and Mozambique – roads, bridges, railways and a raid on Beira harbour - both to stop infiltration of PF guerrillas and supplies but also to induce front line states to put pressure on the PF to adopt a more conciliatory posture towards Salisbury at the negotiations. By November, South Africans were operating in strength in the south-east of Rhodesia and were being supplied by air from bases within South Africa. By December they were operating north of Chiredzi and they let it be known that it was their intention to commit a battalion to each of the five major operational areas, each with a company-sized fire force. At the same time FPLM soldiers from Mozambique were fighting alongside ZANLA.

Frontline leaders now wanted an end to the fighting and brought intense pressure to bear on the PF leaders. Samora Machel threatened to expel Mugabe from Mozambique so Mugabe, who was totally dependent on these bases, was put in an arm-lock to forgo an unconditional surrender option and was forced to accept an agreement. On 12th December 1979, whilst parties were still negotiating, Lord Soames was sent to Salisbury as the new British Governor; Southern Rhodesia returned to the status of a British colony and United Nations sanctions were lifted. However, although the rebellion was over the war continued, and it was not until 21st December 1979 that final agreement was reached and a ceasefire was signed.

The negotiations had lasted for almost three and a half months with both sides coming under intense pressure to reach a settlement by the time the conference ended.



Figure 2.13 A commemorative cover from London signed by Ian Smith marking the start of the Lancaster House Conference in London on 10th September 1979.




Figure 2.14 A London cover commemorating the signing of the ceasefire on 21 December 1979 which marked the end of the Lancaster House Conference.



Figure 2.15 Commemorative cover noting that although Lord Soames, the British Governor, arrived and took up his post on 12 December 1979, a ceasefire was not signed until 21 December 1979.

2.3 The ceasefire

Nobody in Zimbabwe Rhodesia really believed that the ceasefire would hold. However Lord Soames, a grandson of Winston Churchill, was able to gain the respect of both sides of the conflict and General Walls gained the trust and respect of the British.

The 1 300 Commonwealth Force was the key to peace. It comprised 159 Australians, 75 New Zealanders, 51 Kenyans and 24 Fijians, with the remainder drawn from 35 different British military units. Their immediate task was to supervise the movement of all PF guerrillas into 17 Assembly Points by a deadline of 4th January and keep them there until elections could take place. By 6th January 1980, 15 730 guerrillas had assembled, eventually increasing to a reported 22 000. The ceasefire did encounter difficulties; at least 7 000 fully trained ZANLA troops stayed outside the APs with a further 17 000 still in Mozambique; an estimated 500 fully trained ZIPRA troops remained outside the APs with a further 10 000 in Zambia; not all South African troops were withdrawn and intimidation of voters by all sides mounted.

In addition to supervising the movements of guerrillas into the APs and once there, reassuring them that they would not be attacked by Rhodesian security forces, the Commonwealth force became responsible for feeding and clothing and entertaining them in the Assembly Points for two months, a really challenging task in that environment. The small groups of Commonwealth troops deployed around each of the 15 AP's (two of the 17 were abandoned). However remarkably few incidents ensued. On 6th January Lord Soames authorised the deployment of the Rhodesian security forces with orders to use minimum force. In addition to regular units, more than 15 000 auxiliaries were deployed. Soames was forced to rely on the security forces and police , as well as the Rhodesian civil service, to administer the transition effectively. However, with 95% of the country now under martial law, Walls was the key figure.

As the elections approached, every Commonwealth contingent wanted to withdraw from the APs before the election results were announced, fearing the possible reactions of the guerrillas in the APs if their respective leader did not become Prime Minister. General Acland eventually persuaded the Ceasefire Commission – made up of representatives of the security forces, ZIPRA and ZANLA – that small security force detachments should replace Commonwealth troops in the APs. "Small police units had already been positioned" (Ref. 5 - Moorcraft & McLaughlin, page 175).

Here I am indebted to Anthony Stidolph for permitting me to quote from his blog "STIDY'S EYE, SOLDIERING ON . . " and for providing me with personal photographs (Ref. 11). Anthony undertook his 12-months National Service with Intake 129 from the beginning of 1973, after which he served as a territorial with 1st Battalion Rhodesia Regiment until 1980. His unit replaced the Commonwealth contingent at Assembly Point Alpha at Hoya in the Zambezi Valley.


I auote: -

"As members of the Rhodesian Territorial Army, we were ordered to step into the breach. In a sense, we were being called upon to supervise our own defeat.

Close to the Mozambique border, it was an area of intense heat and thick bush. The ZANLA forces already at the Assembly Point had taken good advantage of this, spreading themselves out, no doubt with an eye for both attack and defence, over a wide area. A few of their commanders did set up camp near us but the rest of their troops remained hidden well out of sight. Knowing they were out there somewhere, probably very suspicious and trigger-happy and with their weapons pointed towards us, was not a comforting feeling. To say we were both outnumbered and outgunned would be an understatement – there were over 1 600 ZANLA guerillas and only 26 of us, living under tents supplied by the US Army."

"Although on the surface, we were able to establish a sort of peace between us there was no escaping a deeper atmosphere of distrust and hostility. This was hardly surprising considering how long we had fought as bitter enemies."

The photographs that follow do more than words to illustrate what an Assembly Point was like. The territorials of the Rhodesia Regiment certainly pulled their weight as an important component of Rhodesia's security forces.




The contingent from 1st Battalion Rhodesia Regiment which was posted to AP Alpha.

Figure 2.16 "Assembly Point Alpha, our entire force"

Figure 2.17 "there were over 1 600 ZANLA guerillas"



Figure 2.18
"there was no escaping a deeper atmosphere of distrust and hostility"



(Photographs courtesy of Anthony Stidolph).



Figure 2.20 Once again a machine cancellation with a political slogan was adopted in the runup to the British supervised general election to select the first Zimbabwe Government.

This slogan, THE PEOPLE WANT PEACE, was only in English and was used by Bulawayo, Causeway, Gwelo, Salisbury and Umtali.

This example is dated 18 DEC 1979, just 3 days before the ceasefire was signed.



Figure 2.21 The green circular military cachet reading "RHODESIAN ARMY / OFFICIAL FREE" is superimposed by the machine slogan reading "THE PEOPLE WANT PEACE".

The cover was posted on 14 NOV 1979, during the Lancaster House negotiations but before the arrival of Lord Soames in Salisbury.

The general election to elect the first Zimbabwe Government was held in accordance with the agreements reached during the Lancaster House Conference which took place in London, beginning on 10th September 1979 and ending on 21st December 1979 with the signing of the ceasefire. It was supervised by Lord Soames, the British Governor.

On 14 February 1980 there was to be a poll for the 20 seats on the white voter's roll. In the event, 14 of the seats were not contested. All 20 seats were won by Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front which polled 83% of the votes in the 6 contested seats.

The second stage of the elections for the 80 common roll seats was held from 27th to 29 February 1980 at 657 polling stations spread across eight districts. These were staffed by local civil servants supervised by 80 British officials under an electoral commissioner, Sir John Boynton. In addition, they worked under the scrutiny of 200 international observers, an eleven-member Commonwealth group and 500

journalists. There were constant complaints, threats, violence and intimidation on all sides, together with a lack of trust. The Registrar-General of Elections refused to put the ZANU-PF intended logo on ballot papers because it contained an image of an AK47 rifle which he considered detrimental to public order. The Election Commissioner concluded that, despite some distortion of voting as a result of intimidation in certain areas, the overall result would broadly reflect the wishes of the people. At the end of the process observers concurred in the view that the elections had been held under difficult circumstances but had been substantially free, fair, secret and without undue intimidation. If the estimate of the population was correct, the 2 700 275 votes counted represented a 93% voter turnout.

In the elections themselves ZANU-PF emerged as the overwhelming victor, with 63% of the votes and 57 of the 80 seats allocated to Africans, Nkomo's PF-ZAPU (who campaigned under the Patriotic Front logo) received 24% of the votes and won 20 seats while Muzorewa's UANC acquired only 8% of the votes and won 3 seats.



Figure 2.22 The elections held at the end of February 1980 for the first government of Zimbabwe. The common role vote was for a party, represented by a symbol. PF-ZAPU, Nkomo's party, chose to campaign as PATRIOTIC FRONT. ZANU were precluded from using their party's intended logo on ballot papers because it featured an AK47 rifle, 'considered detrimental to public order '.

The size of Mugabe's victory surprised everyone. However, there was a feeling among many of the war weary populace that a ZANU-PF electoral victory would secure peace and normality while Muzorewa and Sithole, both the potential focus of Shona support, had discredited themselves through their participation in the compromising Zimbabwe Rhodesia internal settlement.

Eventually, Robert Mugabe assumed the role of Prime Minister and the country gained independence as Zimbabwe. The Prince of Wales, later to become King Charles III, took down the Union Jack and hoisted the new flag of Zimbabwe in Rufaro Stadium, Salisbury at midnight 17th April 1980.

The white population was stunned. White opinion had been generally supportive of Muzorewa's government for including competent Ministers, and hoped that Muzorewa would win enough common roll seats to deprive ZANU–PF of a majority. Some whites accepted Mugabe's call for understanding between the races whilst many prepared to quit Zimbabwe. Others could not do so because the financial restrictions on emigration grew even tighter.

However, their fears proved wildly overblown during the first decade of Independence.




Figure 2.23 Postmarked Field Post Office 234 on 21 FE 80. The aerogramme is endorsed with the cachet of the FIJI contingent of the Monitoring Force.



Figure 2.24 Postmarked Field Post Office 234 on 21 FE 80. The aerogramme is endorsed with the cachet of the KENYA contingent of the Monitoring Force.




Figure 2.25 An imaginative cover commemorating the transition from Zimbabwe Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.

The Prince of Wales, later King Charles III, lowered the Union Jack and hoisted the new Zimbabwean flag at a ceremony in Rufaro Stadium, Salisbury at midnight, 17th April 1980.

The conflict had exacted a terrible toll on the country. 95% of the country was under martial law. The death toll by some estimates exceeded 30 000 with a further 10 000 crippled, blinded or maimed. Large sections of the rural population were homeless, suffering from malnutrition, displaced from schools or awaiting repatriation from frontline states. Of the 100-odd mission hospitals and clinics in the rural areas, half were closed, either burned to the ground or looted and badly damaged and half the country's rural schools had been closed or destroyed.

The Postal Services

At the end of 1972 when the bush war 'proper' is regarded as having started, the PTC network of post offices and postal agencies covered the entire country, with numerous agencies located in isolated rural business centres, mission stations, railway stations, mines and small farm settlements. Distributing the mails between these offices was a PTC responsibility. It used the most convenient and cost effective mode of transport appropriate to each location which included bicycles and PTC vans in urban settings, with rail, road or airmail as required elsewhere. In some circumstances, the postal agent would provide the transport to and from the controlling office. Extensive use was made of postal arrangements such as post office boxes and private bags where mail delivery or collection could be the responsibility of either the PTC or the customer depending on local circumstances.


Since 1965 the PTC had been faced with the unusual challenge of international sanctions being applied to Rhodesia's international mail by some countries, although by the end of 1972 the effects of these actions had largely been eroded. The airmail route via East Africa remained closed but alternative air routes through South Africa were in place. Several countries continued to deny all postal services with Rhodesia while India refused to recognise the validity of any Rhodesian postage stamps, only effecting delivery subject to surcharge until October 1977.

Now the PTC was facing another major challenge brought about by the bush war. The dangers to post office staff and agents, and to transport links between offices increased as the war intensified and the area of hostilities spread, until by 1979 almost all parts of the country were under attack. The description of how the bush war developed from the end of 1972 until the ceasefire in December 1979, as described in Parts 1 and 2, puts into context the challenge that the PTC faced and how postal services adapted. Interesting evidence of what delays may have occurred can be found on registered letters involving rural offices as these often carry the date stamps of the sending office, transit offices and a receiving date stamp at the office of destination. The few such covers seen include a delay of 12 days between Mupandawana and Fort Victoria in March 1980, Chikwanda to Fort Victoria took 3 days in March 1980 and Gokwe to Que Que 9 days in March 1980. No excessive delays were noted before 1977 while mail between the main cities was normally the next day even in 1980. This is an area awaiting further research.

The over-riding change in the profile of post office customers requiring it's services was the result of the ever increasing size of the Rhodesian security forces, with members often located in places that the PTC was unable to reach. In this scenario, delivery and collection became the responsibility of the customer rather than the PTC, though the security forces utilised available PTC services whenever possible. Perhaps partly in recognition of this situation, mail <u>from</u> members on active service to a Rhodesian address was sent through the post without charge, but required the endorsement 'Forces Mail' and a relevant unit hand stamp or the Rhodesian Army Official Free cachet, or both, but mail addressed <u>to</u> members on active service continued to require the normal postage stamps. However, few surcharged covers for such mail have been noted.

Part 3 Military Mail

Most Government departments used a Causeway post office address and continued to rely on normal postal services.



Figure

3.1 Ministry of Defence, PO Box 8138, Causeway. OFFICIAL FREE. REGISTRAR OF DEFENCE MANPOWER. "RHODESIA" appears to have been excised? OGS letter posted from Causeway 15 MAY 1974 addressed to Bulawayo.




Figure 3.2 THE REGISTRAR, NATIONAL REGISTRATION, PO Box 8138, Causeway. Rhodesia. OGS letter posted 3 JAN 1974 (year unclear) addressed to Bulawayo.




Figure 3.3 DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY MANPOWER, Private Bag 7732, Causeway. OGS letter posted from Causeway 26 MAR 1979 addressed to Army Recruiting, Salisbury.

COMOPS, the combined services operations headquarters, was set up in Salisbury in 1977 to streamline the war effort. It was designed to prevent the kind of duplication, and even contradictory effort, which had sometimes arisen prior to this date. COMOPS had direct command over the Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) which were deployed in each of the 7 operational zones.

The JOC for Op. Hurricane was in Bindura. There was a Sub-Joc at Mount Darwin




Figure 3.4 OGS letter posted from Mount Darwin 19 JUL 1976 addressed to Bindura

The letter was sent by: -

B.S.A. POLICE, JOC REPRESENTATIVE, MOUNT DARWIN. RHODESIA

It is addressed to: -

Joc (Mashops) [JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE (MASHONALAND OPERATIONS)], BSA Police, P O Box 20, Bindura.

3.1 Army Regular Forces

Units used the normal postal services provided by a convenient post office and organised delivery and collection to addressees themselves.



Figure 3.5 HQ 1 BRIGADE, PO Box 698, Bulawayo. OGS letter posted in Bulawayo 29 MAY 1972. Two years after the country became a Republic, the H.Q. I Brigade cachet still carries the Royal Crown, and describes the country as Southern Rhodesia. Obviously, an oversight. Inset is the cachet of 9th Bn The ('Royal' excised) Rhodesia Regiment, Brady Barracks, Bulawayo, which appears on the reverse side of the cover. 9RR uses the Brigade HQ address.




Figure 3.6 HQ 1 BRIGADE, PO Box 698, Bulawayo.

OGS letter posted in Bulawayo 6 MAR 1975. It was common for OFFICIAL FREE cachets to omit the day from the address (so that it was not necessary to adjust the cachet date every day?).




Figure 3.7 A Specimen strike which illustrates the address. HQ 1 BRIGADE TAC (TANGENT), 12 JUL 1978, PO Box 698, Bulawayo. The tactical HQ for Op. Tangent located in the operational area used the Bulawayo address.

In 1977, callups increased and whites continued to emigrated. To supplement territorial numbers, black recruits received rudimentary training, sometimes lasting for only a few weeks, at the Essexvale training school before being posted to the Independent companies and territorial battalions.



Figure 3.8 Letter posted from Essexvale 18 DEC 1978 1 Bde. BATTLE SCHOOL, 18 DEC 1978, PO Box 60, Essexvale. Rhodesia. This 1 Brigade unit used a local Essexvale post office address.




Figure 3.9 HEADQUARTERS 2 Brigade, OLD CRANBORNE BARRACKS, 29 OCT 1976, Pvt Bag 6320, PO Cranborne. Salisbury. Rhodesia.

OGS letter posted from Cranborne 1 NOV 1976.



Figure 3.10 OFFICIAL FREE HEADQUARTERS 3 BRIGADE (the word "MAIN" excised), 19 DEC 1978, Private Bag 7068, Umtali.

Letter posted from Umtali 18 DEC 1978. It is interesting to note that the military cachet is dated the day after posting, suggesting that it has been done to avoid the letter being surcharged as it has not been endorsed "Forces Mail". An obliging member of the post office staff?



Figure 3.11 Forces mail letter posted from Mount Darwin 15 NOV 1973 addressed to Bulawayo.

1ST BATTALION, THE RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY.

The RLI used a Cranborne private bag address.




Figure 3.12 Letter posted in Salisbury 20 DEC 1977 addressed to Marandellas. GREY'S SCOUTS, based at Inkomo Garrison outside Salisbury, used a Salisbury private bag address.



Figure 3.13 Forces Mail letter posted in Fort Victoria 20 SEP 1977 addressed to Bulawayo. SUPPORT COMPANY 1BN. THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN RIFLES.

The Support Company used a Llewellin Barracks post office address.




Figure 3.14 Forces Mail letter posted from Balla Balla 9 JUN 1977 addressed to Salisbury.

DEPOT HEADQUARTERS THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN RIFLES.

The Depot Headquarters used a local Balla Balla post office address.

The Rhodesia Regiment Independent Companies were made up of whites undertaking their National Service which lasted a full year or longer of continuous callup. These units were treated as regular army for the purposes of their mail. By 1979 these units comprised mostly black soldiers and control of the six Independent Companies was transferred to the Rhodesian African Rifles.




Figure 3.15 Forces Mail letter posted from Inyanga 2 MAR 1977 addressed to Salisbury. 3 (INDEP) COY RR used an Inyanga private bag address.




Figure 3.16 Forces Mail letter posted from Victoria Falls 13 JUN 1977 addressed to Marandellas. 4 (INDEP) COY RR used a Llewellin Barracks post office address.

3.1 Army Territorial Forces: The Military Post Office

The bush war in Rhodesia required the establishment of a specific postal service to suit the special requirements of those who wished to communicate with members of the <u>territorial army</u> who were on callup, as the existing postal network did not operate in the remote and hostile environments where they were often located. In collaboration with the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, the Military Post Office (MPO) was established in February 1974, serving Operation Hurricane in the north and north east of Rhodesia. The system grew and became more complex with the escalation of the war. The Military Post Office system officially ceased operations on 30th April 1980. The system operated as follows⁶: -

Callup papers included specially printed M.P.O. labels, one of which, a 'specimen label', had been completed with the regimental number, name and initials, company and unit of the service member. A 'specimen' label was also available on request to any member of the general public who wished to communicate with someone on callup. Blank labels were completed using the details on the 'specimen' and affixed to any postal article before being posted in the normal way. All postal items bearing such labels required normal postage to be paid and were initially sorted by the PTC and delivered to 2 Brigade Headquarters, Old Cranborne Barracks, Salisbury. There, until March 1975, the mail was sorted into private bags with padlocks and delivered to sub- MPOs 1, 2 and 3 in the operational area on an irregular basis using whatever military transport was available. Bags were emptied at destination and delivery into the field was effected. Bags with mail from troops in the field was returned to 2 Brigade. After March 1975 mail was sorted into unit lots, made up into bags and delivered by normal post office routes to civilian post offices in the field closest to the locations occupied by the sub-MPOs. Mail was held at the MPOs to await collection by the units concerned. Frequently some mode of transport would leave a sub-MPO location to re-supply units further afield and opportunity was taken to effect delivery by such means. Distinct from MPOs, mail addressed to unit home bases, which have fixed postal addresses, was distributed from these points to units in the field using their own transport arrangements. Finally, In some instances, arrangements were made with the PTC for a rural Postmaster to act as an agent for the MPO during short periods of deployment of units to designated areas. Although the MPO system was available to regular units and to other branches of the armed forces, no examples of such use have been reported.

Initially, control of the military mail service vested in 2 Brigade, and was operated by 1 Military Postal Platoon from 2 Brigade Headquarters, Old Cranborne Barracks, Salisbury. As the network grew, control of 1 Military Postal Platoon was transferred to the Directorate of Army Education.

Mail <u>from</u> service members was sent without charge, but required the endorsement 'Forces Mail' and a relevant unit hand stamp or the circular Rhodesian Army Official Free cachet, or both.

MPO address labels were printed for use in the MPO system and had a distinctive colour for each operational zone:-

1974	Green	MPO 1	Salisbury	Op. Hurricane
1976	Yellow	MPO 1	Bulawayo	Op. Tangent
1974	Green	MPO 2	Salisbury	Op. Hurricane
1976	Salmon	MPO 3	Salisbury	Op. Thrasher
1976	Salmon	MPO 3	Umtali	Op. Thrasher
1976	White	MPO 4	Fort Victoria	Op. Repulse
1978	Pale Blue / Grey	MPO 5	Gwelo	Op. Grapple

Call-up papers issued on 17 July 1977 by B Coy 1RR included the following instructions about mail in paragraph 7: -

```
"7 MAIL
Your address is:-

Number - - 75541----- Rank--- L/CPL---- Name ---NAME.-----
--B - - Coy 1RR
MPO 2
SALISBURY
```

- a) A new postal system has been introduced to ensure a better mail service to personnel serving in the operational areas. The service embraces the transmission of letters, registered letters, newspapers and magazines, small packets, shoe box size parcels and insured parcels <u>ONLY</u>.
- b) It is essential that all mail matter is fully and correctly addressed. You will find enclosed a supply of green gummed labels whereon your relevant details should be written in ink. This should be done prior to mobilisation and the label should be distributed to parties who are likely to correspond with you while you are serving. The Postal Orderlies at the Military Post Office hold additional supplies of these labels on which you may draw as required should your initial issue of labels not be sufficient.
- c) The completed labels are to be affixed to letters, newspapers and magazines, parcels, small packets and insured parcels and, after the <u>pre-payment of postage</u>, should be committed to the post. These labels are not to be affixed to registered letters; a suitable facsimile of the address must appear on the cover of any item to be registered.
- d) Any deviation from this method of addressing will result in delays or even non-delivery of your mail in default of this instruction. Any disclosure of the area in which you are serving will result in disciplinary action being taken against you.
- e) It is imperative that the sender's name and address appears on all items posted.
- f) N.B. THE ARMY WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSS OF MONEY DESPATCHED THROUGH MILITARY POST OFFICES WHETHER REGISTERED OR NOT.
- g) You are to ensure that those parties who are likely to correspond with you are aware that the green gummed labels do <u>NOT</u> take the place of the normal postage stamps; postage stamps are to be affixed in the normal manner. The only mail that is sent free is the mail you send back to your correspondents.
- h) You are also to advise your correspondents that should they wish to send parcels, the following should be adhered to:
 - i. Perishables must NOT be sent.
 - ii. Parcels should NOT exceed approximate shoe box size. Large parcels create a transport problem and may not be delivered to the addressee.
- j) If you have any reason to write to this unit (1RR), <u>all</u> correspondence should be addressed to the Adjutant, 1RR, P. O. Box 8023, Causeway."




Figure 3.17 This letter, addressed to MPO 3 SALISBURY, was posted in Umtali on 1 NOV 1976 without postage stamps. Accordingly, it was surcharged 8c, double the local surface rate of 4c. Mail addressed to members of the security forces required normal postage charges to be paid. The surcharge was collected by the Umtali post office. M.P.O. 3 SALISBURY serviced the Op. Thrasher zone, so the post office of destination would have been Umtali.



Figure 3.18 Mail <u>from</u> members of the security forces to addresses within Rhodesia marked 'Forces Mail' and with an appropriate official cachet was carried free through the post. Despite the number, rank and unit being shown on the reverse side, this letter has not been endorsed with an appropriate military cachet, so has been correctly surcharged 6c, double the local surface rate of 3c in 1974.




Figure 3.19 MPO 1 Salisbury opened in February 1974 for mail addressed to the Op Hurricane zone. This label, the first green label, had seriffed lettering. Later printings used non-serifed lettering. Letter addressed to a territorial member of the army on callup. It was posted from Bulawayo on 3 SEP 1974. The normal postal system delivered it to MPO 1 Salisbury from where the military network arranged delivery within the Op. Hurricane zone. Blank labels were sent out with callup papers together with one completed 'specimen' label which provided the details required to ensure the letter was correctly addressed. Normal postage was payable.




Figure 3.20 Letter addressed to a territorial member of the army on callup, posted from Borrowdale, Salisbury on 6 JUL 1974. The normal postal system delivered it to MPO 2 Salisbury from where the military network arranged delivery within the Op. Hurricane zone.




Figure 3.21 MPO 3 Salisbury opened in March 1976 for mail addressed to the Op Thrasher zone. Letter addressed to a territorial member of the army on callup, posted from Kopje Salisbury on 20 JUL 1976. The normal postal system delivered it to MPO 3 Salisbury from where the military network arranged delivery within the Op Thrasher zone.



Figure 3.22 When MPO 3 opened to handle mail addressed to the new Op. Thrasher zone, it was located at KG V1 Barracks in Salisbury. However, it was soon relocated to Umtali which required a new MPO 3 address label.

Letter addressed to a territorial member of the army on callup, posted from Salisbury on 21 MAR 1977.



Figure 3.23 It is unusual to find a cover addessed to an MPO without a label.
MPO 4 FORT VICTORIA opened in April 1976 for mail addressed to the Op Repulse zone.
This letter addressed to a territorial member of the army on callup, was posted from Bulawayo on 20 APR 1977. The normal postal system delivered it to MPO 4 Fort Victoria from where the military network arranged delivery within the Op Repulse zone.

The cover has the word 'HERE' endorsed on it with a tick, indicating that the addressee was on the 1 RHU roll.




Figure 3.24 MPO 4 Fort Victoria, this time with a newly issued white MPO 4 label. A letter addressed to the same territorial member of the army on callup as the previous letter. It was posted from Bulawayo on 9 MAY 1977.




Figure 3.25 A specimen example of the yellow MPO 1 Bulawayo label prepared in August 1976 for mail addressed to the Op. Tangent zone. These labels were printed but never put into use. The cover also illustrates the MPO 1 cachet dated 12 AUG 1976 and the Rhodesia Army Official Free circular cachet. Apparently, the circular Official Free cachet used either 'RHODESIA ARMY' or 'RHODESIAN ARMY' at random.

No.		Ran	k
Name/Initials			
Coy	······	Uni	t
	M.P.O.	5	GWELO

Figure 3.26 An example of the pale blue-grey MPO 5 Gwelo label prepared in March 1978 for mail addressed to the Op. Grapple zone. These labels were printed but never put into use.

3.2 Air Force Main Bases

The Rhodesian Air Force had two main air bases, at New Sarum in Salisbury and at Thornhill in Gwelo, with the administrative headquarters located in offices in Causeway, Salisbury. The bush war had little impact on their postal services and most outgoing mail carried their standard Official Free cachet.



Figure 3.27 Forces Mail letter posted from Causeway 4 OCT 1974 addessed to Bulawayo. The Rhodesian Air Force Official Free cachet was commonly used.




Figure 3.28 Forces Mail letter posted from Gwelo 16 MAY 1974 addressed to Salisbury. The Rhodesian Air Force Thornhill base used a Gwelo post office box for correspondence.

3.2 Air Force Forward Airfields

The Rhodesian Air Force was an integral part of the country's security forces, particularly their helicopters and light wing aircraft. It was essential that these aircraft were located within the operational areas. Soon after Op. Hurricane was formed, forward airfields were built at Centenary and Mount Darwin, in the north-east of the country. Before then, forward airfields had been established at Wankie and Kariba in response to the guerrilla incursions from Zambia.

By the end of the bush war there were nine forward airfields. Post offices existed at or near each location. These provided the normal postal services. A variety of Official Free cachets were used but few identified the FAF. This is usually identified by the town name in the postmark.

On 2nd March 1970 Rhodesia became a republic and Queen Elizabeth II was replaced as Head of State by the Officer Administering the Government. One consequence of this political change was that the word 'ROYAL' was removed from all official names.





Royal Rhodesian Air Force until 2 March 1970.

Rhodesian Air Force ensign from 1979 until 1980.




Figure 3.29 Letter posted from FAF 2 Kariba 20 AUG 1973 addressed to Salisbury.
The RHODESIAN AIR FORCE OFFICIAL FREE FORCES MAIL cachet
has had the word "ROYAL" excised before "RHODESIAN".




Figure 3.30 Letter posted from FAF 4 at Mount Darwin 1 FEB 1977 addressed to Salisbury. FAF 4 used a Mount Darwin post office box for correspondence.



Figure 3.31 Letter posted from FAF 5 in Mtoko 8 NOV 1979. The Rhodesian Air Force Official Free cachet identifies this as a Forward Airfield without naming which one. The postmark identifies the cachet as FAF 5, Mtoko.

3.3 BSA Police: Duty Uniform Branch

It may appear odd to include the BSA Police in the section describing the effect of the bush war on Military Mail. The first port of call by the public to report crime or to seek assistance was the nearest police Charge Office. Behind this façade lay many sections involved with policing in Rhodesia including Urban and District police stations, the Enquiries Sections, the Crime Prevention Unit, the Licence Inspectorate and other sections needed to maintain law and order in society.

However, as the bush war expanded, large parts of the BSA Police became totally involved in the bush war with postings in the operational areas to directly confront the guerrilla forces.




Figure 3.32 OGS letter posted in Salisbury addressed to Highlands, Salisbury. The Enquiry Section, BSA Police Highlands used the Runiville post office for correspondence.




Figure 3.33 The BSA Police Special Branch, Salisbury Airport. Urban police departments continued to utilise the normal postal services.



Figure 3.34 Forces Mail letter posted from Mtoko on 15 OCT 1979 addressed to Hillside. Salisbury. Provincial police stations continued to use normal postal services. The BSA Police Mtoko used a Mtoko post office box for correspondence.




Figure 3.35 Forces Mail letter posted from Tjolotjo 25 FEB 1978 addressed to Bulawayo. The BSA Police Tjolotjo used the Tjolotjo post office for correspondence which provided normal postal services.



Figure 3.36 Forces Mail letter posted from Plumtree 23 MAY 1978 addressed to Salisbury. Isolated police offices in operational zones had to rely on their own transport to and from the most convenient post office.



Figure 3.37 Forces Mail letter posted from Mount Darwin 8 JUL 1977 addressed to Salisbury.

This particular BSA Police post was made famous by the popular ballad

"It's a Long Way to Mukumbura".

The BSAP Mukumbura Post was located on the border with Mozambique in the far north east of the country, Op. Hurricane territory. Mail was dependent on security forces transport to Mount Darwin. Several examples of unit cachets only show the month and the year for the date, leaving the day blank. This was probably deliberate because of delays between date of receipt and the date of actually posting the letter, sometimes several days, whilst awaiting transport.

3.3 BSA Police: Support Unit

The BSA Police Support Unit barracks were based at Chikurubi on the outskirts of Salisbury from where it became an almost autonomous element within the security forces. Until 1978 it was formed into Troops, thereafter it was restructured into Companies. Support Unit used a Causeway private bag. Members in the operational areas were dependant on security force transport to their most convenient post office for their mail.




Figure 3.38 Forces Mail letter posted from Mount Darwin 20 APR 1976 addressed to Salisbury. The unit cachet BSA POLICE SUPPORT UNIT 'N' TROOP is dated 16 APR 1976 but needed to await security force transport into Mount Darwin.




Figure 3.39 OGS letter posted from Nyanyadzi 20 AUG 1976 addressed to Marula. The unit cachet MEMBER IN CHARGE BSA POLICE ZULU 'I' TROOP is dated 19 AUG 1976.




Figure 3.40 Forces Mail letter posted in Enkeldoorn 3 FEB 1979 addressed to Salisbury.

By 1979 the Support Unit was organised into companies.

This cachet is for B.S.A.POLICE SUPPORT UNIT "B" COY.




Figure 3.41 Forces Mail letter posted from Causeway 3 JUN 1976 addressed to Marandellas, unusually with a 3c postage stamp affixed.

The cachet "BSA POLICE OPERATIONAL FIELD CAMP" illustrates the extent to which parts of the BSA Police had become directly involved in the bush war. The letter inside the envelope identifies the camp as being in the Mount Darwin area. It would have been transported on a re-supply trip into Salisbury where it was posted so as to expedite delivery.

Part 4 Internal Affairs Mail

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, commonly referred to as INTAF, was one of Rhodesia's most important government departments. It was led by the Minister of Internal Affairs and was responsible for the welfare and development of the African population, but this did not include: -

Agriculture - the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The administration of African Purchase Areas – Ministry of Mines and Lands.

Local judicial functions – Ministry of Justice.

Civilian government in the TTLs was administered by District Commissioners. INTAF personnel played a major role in confronting the guerrilla forces, gathering intelligence and monitoring the mood of the local population. As the bush war intensified, District Commissioners took on the responsibility of implementing the Protected Village programme. INTAF staffed and guarded them, developing appropriate security forces in the process. To the east and north east of Mount Darwin, where PVs had not been established, sub-offices were built to monitor potential guerrilla activity. In 1975 a training depot was established at Chikurubi on the outskirts of Salisbury, to ensure that all new District Assistants and members of the Guard Force received full military training.

District Commissioners were mostly based in provincial towns and villages which had access to the normal postal services. These DC offices served as mail centres for the INTAF personnel in surrounding areas. Any available transport was utilised to convey mail between these DC offices and the PVs and sub-offices within their districts.




Figure 4.1 Forces Mail letter posted from Melsetter 14 OCT 1977 addressed to Salisbury. The District Commissioner in Melsetter used a Melsetter post box for correspondence.

4.1 District Commissioners - Protected Villages

The introduction of Protected Villages is described on page 4. By the end of 1976 an estimated 240 000 rural Africans had been relocated into protected or consolidated villages. As well as implementing and maintaining the PV programme, INTAF staff, together with Guard Force, were involved with administering them and guarding them against guerrilla attacks, and as far as possible preventing the guerrillas from acquiring food, shelter or information from the villagers.

Postal services were required by both communities – by those who had been relocated and by those administrating and guarding the PVs. Quite obviously, normal postal services were out of the question in these locations. From the few covers seen, it appears that mail was directed in the first instance to the office of the DC responsible for the administration of the PV, using the normal postal service. From there, mail was distributed to each of the PVs under their control using any available transport as and when it was available. Outward bound mail would be collected from the PV at the same time and posted at the most convenient post office from where the normal postal services completed delivery.




Figure 4.2 Chiweshe TTL protected villages

A philatelic cover dated 11 JAN 1980 illustrating the NYACHURU Protected Village cachet. The Nyachuru PV was established in 1975. It was located in the Chiweshe TTL a few miles east of the Howard Institute, only about 40 miles north of Salisbury.

The Chiweshe PVs were administered by the DC Concession and used the DC's address.



Figure 4.3 Madziwa TTL protected villages

Forces Mail letter sent from the GOORA Protected Village, posted from Shamva on 5 NOV 1975.

The Madziwa PVs were administered by the DC Shamva and used the DC's address.

Mail marked 'Forces Mail' bearing an appropriate security forces or government cachet went free through the post within Rhodesia but postage needed to be paid for international or registered mail.

Following the establishment of the Chiweshe and Madziwa PVs, Consolidated Villages were introduced in the Maramba TTL, Mrewa district from June 1975 on an experimental basis.

Consolidated Villages were designed to bring together a number of kraals but no security fence, lighting, control of movement or armed detachments were provided. Contingency planning provided for these to be upgraded to PVs should the security situation so require. This project involved about 4 500 permanent residents and 3 000 occasional residents.

(This information has not been verified).




Figure 4.4 Maramba TTL Consolidated Village.

Forces Mail letter sent from the Maremba Village Mudzi District on 6 JUL 1977, posted from Mtoko on 13 JUL 1977. The delay of a week from the time the letter was received for posting until it was delivered to the Mtoko post office was probably because the next supply run was not due until then. There was no post office in Mudzi so the DC Mudzi used a private bag service from the Mtoko Post Office to link with the postal system. The village used the address of the controlling DC as it's mailing address.

4.2 District Commissioners – Protected Sub-Offices

I am indebted to Patrick Stidolph for information about the DC Protected Sub-Offices (Ref. 10). As an INTAF territorial with the rank of Senior Vedette, Patrick spent his callups in PSOs. On a callup with an INTAF Echelon in 1979 he was based at the Bveke PSO, assisting a National Serviceman guard and oversee the area and assumed command for a week during his superior's absence on R & R. District Commissioner Protected Sub-Offices were protected administrative centres administered by a District Commissioner. The Bveke PSO Mount Darwin district was staffed by a National Serviceman supported by a Territorial Vedette and by DAs (District Assistants) and guarded by a black INTAF force headed by an experienced sergeant.

From these PSOs, INTAF staff and their DAs visited Chiefs and Headmen in surrounding villages, seeking intelligence by maintaining contact with the local population. Other activities included early morning patrols to detect landmines.

These PSOs were named and all used the address of the District Commissioner Mount Darwin. Mail to and from Mount Darwin was by security forces transport when available.

It should be noted that many PVs were also administered by the DC Mount Darwin.



Figure 4.5 The KEEP at Masoka.

Patrick was usually based at Mashumbi Pools in the Zambesi Valley beyond Sipolilo, from where he sometimes visited or stayed at Gonono, Masomo, Chitsunga, Harrison, Angwa, Masoka, Chitima and Kanyemba operational bases.

(Photograph courtesy Patrick Stidolph).




Figure 4.6 Forces Mail letter addressed to Salisbury, received by the Chiswiti PSO 29 JAN 1978 but only posted at Mount Darwin 7 FEB 1978.

The cachet establishes that the PSO is controlled by the DC Mount Darwin.



Figure 4.7 Forces Mail letter addressed to Gwelo, received by Pachanza PSO 16 AUG 1978 and posted at Mount Darwin 18 AUG 1978.

The cachet uses the DC Mount Darwin's address for correspondence.



Figure 4.8 Forces Mail letter addressed to Gwelo, received by 'PV19 Sub-Office' 3 SEP 1978 and posted from Mount Darwin the following day, 4 SEP 1978.

Again, the postal address is not included in the cachet.

However, the sender's details are given on the reverse side:
21715 Forder CMS, P. O. Box 96, Mount Darwin, the DC Mount Darwin's address.



Figure 4.9 Forces Mail letter addressed to Bulawayo, received by Bveke PSO 7 OCT 1979 and posted from Mount Darwin the following day, 8 OCT 1979.

This was a letter sent by Senior Vedette Patrick Stidolph during his 6-weeks callup which lasted from 23 SEP 1979 until 30 OCT 1979.

During the final two weeks he was heavily engaged with guerrillas in the surrounding area.

4.3 Mail for Isolated localities

The Ministry of Internal Affairs was also responsible for Customs and Immigration.



Figure 4.10 Forces Mail letter, handed in for posting on 21 FEB 1974 by a territorial member of the unit guarding the post. It entered the postal system at Mtoko the following day.

The Nyamapanda border post was located on the Mozambique border and controlled commerce and immigration between Rhodesia and the Mozambique pedicle, the land route between Rhodesia and Malawi until the border was closed on 3 MAR 1976.

There were no postal facilities at Nyamapanda, so a private mail bag from the Mtoko Post Office was used. Being so isolated, mail was dependent on security force transport.



Figure 4.11 Forces Mail letter, from the same territorial member to the same addressee as the letter above. This letter was posted about one week later at Causeway in Salisbury on the day after it was handed in for posting. Frequently, when a security force re-supply truck was visiting one of the major towns, any mail would be taken and posted there to speed up mail delivery.

4.4 Guard Force

The INTAF Guard Force, which eventually had a strength of over 7 200 personnel made up of black and white members, was formed initially to guard PVs and PSOs but also patrolled surrounding areas and enforced curfews. The headquarters was in North Avenue, Salisbury with a training establishment based at Chikurubi just outside Salisbury and with 5 regional headquarters. Towards the end of the bush war Guard Force also provided protection for white-owned farmland, tribal purchase lands and other strategic locations.

Guard Force used the normal postal services.



Figure 4.12 Forces Mail letter addressed to Causeway posted from Mount Darwin 25 JUL year illegible. Cachet GUARD FORCE GP (Group) HQ, OFFICIAL FREE, Pvt Bag 7736, SALISBURY. (PO Boxes and Private Bags with numbers 7000 and 8000 were all Causeway).




Figure 4.13 Letter addressed to Guard Force HQ, Private Bag 7736, Causeway on 7 JUN 1979. (The machine cancellation date stamp is inverted, quite a common error).



Figure 4.14 Forces Mail letter addressed to Salisbury Zimbabwe posted from Gwelo 14 JUN 1979.

The Guard Force Regional HQ, Gwelo cachet does not include an address.

The country had been renamed ZIMBABWE RHODESIA on 1 JUN 1979.



Figure 4.15 Forces Mail empty window envelope with a clear Guard Force cachet but an indistinct postmark.

The Official Free cachet does not include an address.

Part 5 Impact on the P.T.C.

At the start of 1973 when the bush war 'proper' began, there were 211 PTC offices operating in Rhodesia. Of that number, 61 were urban and peri urban offices attached to the five major cities – Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, Gwelo and Fort Victoria. That left over 70% of the offices located in the smaller towns and rural centres. For the duration of the bush war, the PTC maintained postal services throughout the country and continued to deliver mail in the face of the increasing dangers and challenges. It was not until the latter part of 1976 that the first postal agency was forced to close as a direct result of guerrilla action and by end of 1976 only three offices had closed for this reason. It is not obvious that post offices were specifically targeted, rather that the postal services were operating from buildings located in mission stations, business centres and farms which were the targets of the attacks and formed a part of the general Government infrastructure that was being targeted by guerrillas.

A letter from the Postmaster General dated 23 May 1980 addressed to Chris Munnion in response to his enquiry, lists the post office and postal agencies that were closed as a direct result of the bush war- see Reference 1 on page iv. In the narratives of the offices which closed that follows, those described as 'closed due to direct guerrilla activity' are the offices listed in this letter, and have been highlighted with an asterisk. Office closures and openings have been shown in two parts to accentuate the increasing severity of the impact of the bush war as operational areas expanded. In addition to listing the offices closed, the letter also states: -

"On 16 occasions, mails being transported by private carriers were violated along route resulting in the loss of a large number of registered items, parcels and ordinary mail. From this point of view it could be said that postal services were disrupted to a certain extent but the percentage of losses was very low compared to the amount of mail transported overall. Mails from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls were sent by air."

This illustrates that the distribution of mails was vulnerable to attack just as much as the static offices themselves. Where damage or loss was incurred, the PTC reimbursed such loss. Claims were then certified by the BSA Police as being due to the war situation and submitted by the PTC to Government for reimbursement in terms of the Victims of Terrorism (Compensation) Act (Cap 340). Compensation paid was calculated at 90% of the actual loss incurred, resulting in a shortfall. In total these shortfalls amounted to a considerable net loss to the PTC.

There was no disruption to postal services in the main centres due to the bush war. However, where postal agencies were closed in rural areas, local residents suffered the sometimes very considerable inconvenience of needing to travel to the nearest post office for mail and stamps etc. There were many offices that did not close despite the challenges being faced. Often, the staff operating them would have lived close by, in the same neighbourhood, making them and their families targets, either of being attacked or, probably more likely, of being intimidated and threatened. For safety, some agents would have operated from their homes for varying periods and agencies could have remained closed for several days from time to time. There was also the ever-present challenge of transporting the mail between these small centres and the larger towns due to land mines and ambushes.

The reasons advanced for the closure of each individual office are as described in the PMG's letter to Chris Munnion where applicable. The others are merely opinions based on perceived circumstances and from suggestions received from Rob Burrett. They are not supported by official records. There were 211 PTC offices at the start of 1973. During the following four years, 1973 to 1976, 10 offices were opened or reopened and 17 offices were closed. During the next three years, 1977 to 1979, 11 offices were opened or reopened while 33 offices were closed. Although not all closures were directly due to the bush war, the 50 office closures during the seven years of the bush war demonstrate a significant upheaval in the country's internal mail distribution system while the opening or reopening of 21 offices demonstrates the determination of the PTC to maintain services in the face of these challenges.

5.1 Offices that opened during 1973 to 1976

Although seventeen offices were closed during this period, efforts to maintain normal postal services were ongoing and ten new offices were opened or reopened between January 1973 and December 1976, some in rural locations despite the known dangers. Recruiting and retaining staff to operate these services must have been challenging and sometimes required courage on the part of the local staff themselves.



PAULINGTON Opened 2 JAN 1973

CPO Umtali.

Paulington is a suburb of Umtali located on the road to Melsetter S of Umtali. An MTO had operated from a room at the railway station between 1911 and 1927.

This MTO also opened next door to the Umtali railway station. Postmark type 20L dated 12 FEB 80.



HOWARD Opened 1 AUG 1973

CPO Mazoe.

PA located at the Howard Salvation Army Institute about 44 miles N of Salisbury, 12 miles north of Concession.

The Institute was only a few miles west of the Chiweshe TTL where the Protected Village programme was to be initiated in 1975.

Postmark type 21R dated 20 FEB 1980.



BELLEVUE Reopened 24 NOV 1973

CPO Bulawayo.

PTA servicing a residential suburb that straddled the Plumtree Road, about 3 miles SE of Bulawayo.

The office had closed in August 1972 probably a result of local circumstances because it reopened only a little more than a year later.

Postmark type 13SR dated 20 FEB 1979.



PADDONHURST Opened 1 MAY 1974

CPO Bulawayo.

PTA in the suburb NE of Bulawayo.

Postmark type 21 dated 24 MAY 74.



ATHLONE Opened 1 AUG 1974

CPO Salisbury.

PA in an E suburb of Salisbury under the control of Greendale. Postmark type 19 dated 16(?) AUG 1978.



GWESELA Opened 3 FEB 1975

CPO Que Que

PA located at Chief's Hall 2 miles N of Zhombe Mission and 34 miles N of Que Que. This was another new rural agency that was later forced to close in April 1978 when the agency clerk absconded after being intimidated by guerrilla forces and no replacement could be found. Postmark type 19 dated 19 OCT 1977.



KANA Opened 2 JUN 1975

CPO Gwelo.

PA located on a rural mission station located to the west of Que Que and Gokwe, about 106 miles N of Bulawayo.

Yet another example of a new rural agency that was later forced to close. Postmark type 19 dated 2 JUN 1975.



HAMA Opened 1 JUL 1975

CPO Umvuma

PA on a Catholic mission station founded in 1914 located about 19 miles NW of Fort Victoria off the main road to Umvuma. It was later forced to close in August 1978 following a guerrilla attack.

Postmark type 19 dated 25 OCT 1977.




WATERFORD-BULAWAYO Reopened 1 MAR 1976

CPO Bulawayo.

PA servicing a residential suburb east of Bulawayo.

The PTA had closed 18 months earlier and now reopened as an agency. The agency was regraded to a PTA on 1 SEP 1976.

Postmark type 16DSR dated 10 APR 79.



ALASKA MINE Opened 25 OCT 1976

CPO Sinoia.

The PTA operated from the Alaska Trading Store on one of Rhodesia's largest copper mines, about 8½ miles NW of Sinoia. Production had started in 1959 and it became the centre of smelting and refining operations for all the Lomagundi copper mines.

The agency closed for a short period from 13 DEC 1977 to 31 JAN 1978 for reasons unknown.

Postmark type 19 dated 25 OCT 1976.

5.2 Offices that closed during 1973 to 1976

Security considerations became increasingly relevant and important to offices outside the main towns as hostilities spread and preventative actions to avoid casualties were taken. These actions were often taken on the advice of the security forces, based on their experience and from intelligence gained. Seventeen agencies closed during this 4-year period 1973 – 1976. Reasons included the general security situation in their area, falling demand for postal services resulting from the state of the economy, sanctions, population movements or PTC cost saving measures. It was not until 1976 that three offices closed as a result of direct guerrilla activity.

The reasons advanced for closures which are not the result of direct guerrilla action listed in the Postmaster General's letter - reference 1 - are merely opinions based on perceived circumstances and suggestions received from Rob Burrett. They are not supported by official records.

Where dates of closure differ between those provided in the Postmaster General's letter and those in South of the Zambesi, the Postmaster General's dates are used. These are 'on the ground, day of closure' dates as opposed to the official closing dates used in South of the Zambesi.



KAMBAZUMA Closed 27 APR 1973

CPO Salisbury.

PA that opened in 1971 in a high density suburb west of Salisbury and south of the Bulawayo road. Perhaps a cost reduction measure as it was only open for a short period.

Postmark Type 21. No postmark scan is available. (Image taken from Barry & Barry – ref. 3).



VENGERE Closed 28 FEB 1974

CPO Rusape.

MTO located in the high density suburb of Rusape which had opened in 1972.

The closure seems to be too early to have been a casualty of the bush war so was probably closed by the PTC to save costs. Customers could use the main town post office.

Alternatively, closed due to a local consideration, for example the agent may have resigned.

Postmark type 21 dated 10 DEC 73.



SAUERSTOWNSHIP Closed 32 JUL 1974

CPO Bulawayo

PTA in a small suburb of Bulawayo. The township is located on a block of land which included Dawson's store, the original Gubulawayo post office in 1893.

The office opened in 1934 but seems to have done little business in later years. It was probably closed as a cost saving measure due to lack of demand. Postmark type 13 dated 21 May 1942.



WATERFORD-BULAWAYO Closed 16 SEP 1974

CPO Bulawayo.

PTA in a residential suburb east of Bulawayo which had opened in 1957. The office reopened as an agency 18 months later, so closure was probably the result of local circumstances.

Postmark type 16D dated 9 OCT 62.



PADDONHURST Closed 1 OCT 1974

CPO Bulawayo.

The PTA opened only five months earlier. It probably closed because demand for postal services was below forecasts. Postmark type 21 dated 21 JUN 74.



VICTORY AVENUE UMTALI Closed 3 MAY 1975

CPO Umtali

The MTO opened in 1965 in the city.

It was opened to take the pressure off the main post office in Main Street. It closed in conjunction with the opening of the new Umtali post office building and was subsequently used as a petrol rationing office.

Postmark type 21J-6 dated 3 MAY 75, the date of closure.



GATH'S MINE Closed 31 JUL 1975

CPO Mashaba.

PA which opened in 1949 on a large asbestos mine 2½m NE Mashaba and 21m W of Fort Victoria.

Mine closure. Some of the big asbestos mines in this area west of Fort Victoria became uneconomic so production focused on Shabani instead. Postal services for the village were subsequently provided by the nearby Mashaba office.

Postmark type 21 dated 27 DEC 73



BRADFIELD Closed 30 SEP 1975

CPO Bulawayo.

PTA in a southern suburb of Bulawayo in the vicinity of the Trade Fair grounds which had opened in 1969.

Probably closed by the PTC as a cost reduction measure, this office being close to and located between Famona and Hillside.

Postmark type 21 dated 29 MAR 72



MABIKWA Closed 16 MAR 1976

CPO Wankie.

PA located at the Halfway House Hotel off the main Bulawayo to Victoria Falls road, 112 miles from Bulawayo which opened in 1956. Mails were delivered by RMS vehicles. The security situation was deteriorating which lead to the Operation Tangent zone being opened in October 1976. The hotel was destroyed in the conflict two years later.

Postmark type 13S dated 7 MAR 1973



BORDERVALE Closed 31 MAR 1976

CPO Umtali.

PTA which opened in 1973 at Mac's Grocery Store in Bordervale, an Umtali residential suburb.

This office was only open for 2½ years so closure was probably due to either local circumstances or a PTC cost reduction measure.

Postmark type 21 dated 14 MAR 76.



EASTLEA Closed 1 SEP 1976

CPO Salisbury.

PA in a residential suburb E of the city centre and N of Hillside which had opened in 1955. Closure was probably a PTC cost reduction measure. Postmark type 16E dated 29 JAN 62.



BONDA* Closed 30 SEP 1976

CPO Rusape.

PA which opened in 1961 at St. David Mission, 19m SW of Inyanga and 50m N of Umtali.

Closed when the buildings were burnt down during an attack.

This was the first postal agency to close as a direct consequence of the bush war

Postmark type 13S dated 22 JAN 1972.



CHIRUNDU Closed 30 SEP 1976

CPO Sinoia.

MTO that reopened 1 APR 1969 in the Chirundu township close to the Otto Beit Bridge over the Zambesi River after the agency on the Chirundu Estates closed when the sugar estates ceased operations.

Guerrilla incursions over the Zambesi from Zambia resulted in the border closure on 9 January 1973. The Zambesi Valley had been heavily militarised since 1972 when South African Police entered Rhodesia. By 1976 most mail would have been Forces Mail carried by security forces' transport. Postmark type 21 dated 30 SEP 76 on the final day of operations.



MAKARARA* Closed 8 OCT 1976

PO Wedza.

PA at a business centre in the Ziyambe Purchase Land 36m S of Wedza which opened in 1966.

Closed when the building housing the agency was burnt down. Postmark type 21 dated 15 JAN 72.



GWANGWADZA* Closed 26 OCT 1976

CPO Marandellas.

PA (probably at a business centre) only 35 miles E of Salisbury in the Marandellas district which opened in 1960.

Closed when the building housing the agency burnt down.

Postmark type 13S dated 3 FEB 1969.



BINGALE Closed 25 NOV 1976

CPO Gwanda.

PA which opened in 1966 operating from a trading store in a small settlement and mission station SW of Gwanda, 21m N of Tuli. By this date the security situation in this region had deteriorated and it is likely the store had to close. Military zones Repulse and Tangent had been opened earlier in 1976.

Postmark type 21 dated 6 FEB 71.



WELLESLEY Closed 1 DEC 1976

CPO Salisbury.

PA opened in 1922 at a railway siding 27miles W of Salisbury on the line to Sinoia. A small agency servicing Nkomo Garrison and surrounding area. It had probably become uneconomic. Nkomo Garrison customers switched to Salisbury private bags. Darwendale, 13m further west, was an alternative for local residents. Postmark type 13S dated 30 NOV 1976, the final day of operations.

6 Post Offices and Agencies Opened and Closed 1977 to 1980

From 1977 the area of operations and the pace of hostilities increased rapidly. By August 1977 guerrilla forces were no longer only being confronted along Rhodesia's borders but had penetrated deep into the central areas, necessitating the implementation of Operation Grapple. In many areas road transport between towns was under the constant threat of landmines or ambushes and martial law was being imposed over increasing areas of the country. White emigration continued to accelerate and for those whites remaining, the level of military callups became more onerous. Employers throughout the economy faced challenges when positions filled by whites needed to be filled by less experienced deputies during absences on callup. The postal system within the country also faced these challenges, so it is not surprising that during the following three-year period no less than thirty-three post offices and agencies closed, either as a result of direct guerrilla actions as listed in the Postmaster General's letter (see reference 1) or for other reasons. Three agencies which closed were subsequently reopened, one of them for only a few months before closing once again.

During 1977, 2 offices were opened and 11 closed, 8 of which were due to guerrilla actions. During 1978, 6 offices were opened and 13 closed, 8 of which were due to guerrilla actions. In addition, 4 incidents were recorded in the Postmaster General's letter (reference 1).

During 1979/80, 3 offices were opened and 9 closed, 6 of which were due to guerrilla actions. In addition, 1 incident was recorded in the Postmaster General's letter (reference 1).

6.1 Offices that opened during 1977 to 1980



MUPANDAWANA Opened 1 FEB 1977

CPO Gwelo

PTA located at the first growth point developed by the Rhodesian Government, about 37 miles NE of Fort Victoria

Postmark type 19 dated 22 FEB 1979.



MADZIWA Opened 6 JUN 1977

CPO Shamva.

PA at the nickel mine 22 miles N of Shamva. The nickel ore was transported by road to Shamva and then by rail to the smelter at Bindura.

Postmark type 19 dated 7 NOV 1977.



SANYATI Opened 1 FEB 1978

CPO Gatooma.

PA at a village and mission station 50 miles NW of Gatooma on the Sanyati River. The area was well known for its irrigated agriculture which was supported by the Agricultural Development Authority. The region produced large quantities of high grade cotton.

Postmark type 19R dated 24 MAR 1980.



MAGWEGWE Opened 3 APR 1978 CPO Bulawayo. MTO. High density suburb E of Bulawayo.

Postmark type 24sJ-2 dated 1 FEB 80.



GLEN NORA Opened 1 MAY 1978

CPO Salisbury.

MTO. High density suburb SW of Salisbury along the Beatrice Road.

Postmark type 21I-2 dated 1 MAY 78.



CHENJIRI Re-opened 8 MAY 1978

CPO Hartley.

PA at a village near Nyabira on the railway line to Sinoia, 24m W of Salisbury. It was originally opened 4 JUL 1967 but closed as a result of direct guerrilla action on 5 SEP 1977 (see page 72).

Following this reopening, it was again forced to close on 16 JUL 1978 (see page 75).

Postmark type 21 dated 18 MAY 78. Apparently this new date stamp was only brought into use when the agency reopened.



RUSHINGA Opened 1 OCT 1978

CPO Mount Darwin.

PA at a village located about 33 miles NE of Mount Darwin.

This was a military base for operations in the area.

Postmark type 19 dated 3 NOV 1978.



GWAAI Re-opened at a new location 2 OCT 1978

CPO Wankie.

This new agency opened in a store at Dahlia, a small roadside village and busy military base on the main Bulawayo to Victoria Falls Road where it crosses the Gwaai River. The agency had no connection with the Gwaai River Hotel close by. The date stamp from the agency at the previous location of GWAAI was used here so the only way to differentiate the postmarks of the two different Gwaai agencies is by the date. Postmarks dated after 2 OCT 1978 are from this location.

Postmark type 13S dated 31 OCT 1978.

(Reference 4)



MAMINA Reopened 2 APR 1979¹

CPO Gatooma.

PA at a mission located in the Ngezi TTL about 15m E of Featherstone, some 50m SW of Salisbury which had been forced to close in March 1978 (see page 74).

Postmark type 21 dated 2 MAR 79¹.

¹The date of this postmark would suggest that the agency had reopened earlier, at least by 2 MAR 1979.



AMBY Opened 1 OCT 1979

CPO Salisbury

MTO located in the Msasa estate, a mainly industrial suburb on the Umtali Road E of the city centre.

Opened when Beverley, a nearby office, closed.

Postmark types 24sJ-1 dated 25 JAN 80.



MASHOKO Reopened 2 NOV 1979

CPO Fort Victoria

Postal agency at a mission station in the Bikita area 65m SE of Fort Victoria. The agency had been forced to closed about 3 months earlier in August 1979 (see page 78).

Postmark type 21J-1R dated 20 MAR 1980.

6.2 Offices that closed during 1977 to 1980

Here I repeat the caveats relating to the closures during 1973 – 1976 which are also relevant to this period: -

Security considerations became increasingly relevant and important to offices outside the main towns as hostilities spread and preventative actions to avoid casualties were taken. These actions were often taken on the advice of the security forces, based on their experience and from intelligence gained. Thirty-two agencies closed during this 3-year period 1977 – 1979/80. Reasons included the general security situation in their area, falling demand for postal services resulting from the state of the economy, sanctions, population movements or the result of PTC cost savings decisions.

The reasons advanced for closures which are not the result of direct guerrilla action listed in the Postmaster General's letter - reference 1 - are merely opinions based on perceived circumstances and suggestions received from Rob Burrett. They are not supported by official records. Where dates of closure differ between those provided in the Postmaster General's letter and those in South of the Zambesi, the Postmaster General's dates are used. These are 'on the ground, day of closure' dates as opposed to the official closing dates used in South of the Zambesi.



CHIKWANDA* Closed 6 JAN 1977

CPO Fort Victoria.

PA (probably at a growth point) about 35m NNE of Fort Victoria which opened in 1967.

The building housing the agency was destroyed by fire.

Postmark type 21J-1 dated 9 APR 70.



HONDE* Closed 25 MAR 1977

CPO Umtali.

PA which had opened in 1966 (probably at a growth point) on the Honde River in the Honde Valley about 25m NE of Umtali.

The agency closed when, following several break-ins, the agency clerk was forced at gun point to hand over the contents of his safe.

Postmark type 21J-1 dated 26 MAR 69.



BEMBESI Closed 31 MAR 1977

CPO Bulawayo

PTA which opened in 1905 at a small railway service centre 31 miles E of Bulawayo on the line to Gwelo. The area is occupied by Fingo (Xhosa) migrants. Many worked for Government and it is unlikely that they were directly involved in the bush war. Closure was more likely a loss reduction measure

Postmark type 13xS dated 31 MAR 1977.



WATSOMBA* Closed 21 JUN 1977

CPO Umtali.

PTA which had opened in 1923 on a mission station and administrative and trading centre 25m N of Umtali on the Inyanga road.

The agency closed when the building housing the agency was destroyed by fire.

Postmark type 13 dated 20 MAR 1961.



CHENJIRI* Closed 5 SEP 1977


CPO Hartley

PA which opened in 1967 at a village near Nyabira on the railway line to Sinoia, only 24m W of Salisbury.

It closed as a result of guerrilla activity in the area.

The PA re-opened about nine months later in MAY 1978.

Postmark type 19 dated 6 FEB 1972.




KANA* Closed 19 AUG 1977

CPO Gwelo.

PA on a mission station about 106m N of Bulawayo which opened on 6 JUN 1975. Closed due to intimidation. The mission station was abandoned and the staff and pupils dispersed. Postmark type 19 dated 4 AUG 1975 on a registered letter.

This registered letter was posted at Kana 4 AUG 1975, shortly after opening, addressed to Salisbury. Transit date stamp on reverse side Bulawayo 6 AUG 1975 with receiving date stamp Salisbury 7 AUG 1975. This illustrates normal delivery.



GWAAI* Closed at this location 31 AUG 1977

CPO Wankie.

PTA. At the time of closure, this office was operating out of a small store close to the Gwaai railway siding. It opened as Gwaai Siding in 1940.

The PTA closed when the store accommodating the PTA was discontinued by the owner due to increasing harassment by guerrilla forces. Postmark type 13<u>S</u> dated 31 AUG 1977. A new agency also named GWAAI re-opened at a new location on 2 OCT 1978 (see reference 4).

RUSITU* Closed 1 OCT 1977



CPO Melsetter.

PA at a mission station 25m S of Melsetter where it opened in 1949. The PA was closed on the instructions of the Rhodesian military authorities due to the critical security situation in the region. Postmark type 21J-1 dated 29 DEC 71.



CHINOYI Closed 1 DEC 1977

CPO Sinoia.

PA that opened in March 1968 in the Sinoia high density suburb.

This was an urban hotbed that generally supported nationalist aspirations. It may have been felt necessary to pay closer attention to African mails at the time. The army could censor/open mail at the larger post office in Sinoia. Postal services could be provided by the main Sinoia post office which was not far away, so closure may have had an economic aspect also. Postmark type 19 dated 19 OCT 1977.



BIRCHENOUGH BRIDGE Closed 2 DEC 1977

CPO Fort Victoria.

PA opened in 1934 to service a village which developed next to the bridge which spans the Sabi River. 85m SSW of Umtali on the road to Fort Victoria. It became the centre of a small-scale farming area. This was considered a most dangerous convov route. The hotel would have closed and most civil servants withdrawn.

Postmark type 19 dated 30 NOV 1977.



LOWER GWELO* Closed 31 DEC 19771

CPO Gwelo.

PA which had opened in 1946 at a Seventh Day Adventist mission, 19m NW of Gwelo at the S end of the Lower Gwelo TTL. It closed when the building accommodating the agency was destroyed by fire.

Postmark type 13sS dated 20 JUL 77.

¹South of the Zambesi state PA closed 13 DEC 1978. However, no postmarks are recorded during 1978. Error?



WILTON* Incident only on 13 JAN 1978

CPO Marandellas.

PA located at an administrative centre 28m S of Macheke on the outskirts of the Dowa Purchase Area which had opened in 1947. The agency was attacked and the building housing the agency was destroyed by fire. However the agency was run by a white farmer who continued to run the agency from alternative premises.

Postmark type 13CSR dated 1 MAY 79.



MSENGEZI* Closed 5 FEB 1978

CPO Hartley.

PA located at the S end of the Msengezi TTL, a trading centre 50m from Salisbury on the railway line to Hartley, 8m W of Makwiro which opened in October 1963.

Closed when the agency building burnt down during an armed conflict. Postmark type 16S dated 19 OCT 77.



SALISBURY* Incidents only on 4 MAR 1978

This was the day following the signing of the Internal Settlement.

Two pillar posting boxes in Salisbury were blown up by explosive devices. As a result, the apertures of all posting boxes were reduced in size so as to permit the entry of a standard sized letter only.

On the same day a bomb exploded in the private box area of the Salisbury post office complex necessitating the replacement of about 100 windows and other superficial damage. No staff were injured.

Postmark type 16J-18S dated 3 MAR 78, the day before these incidents.



MAMINA* Closed 20 MAR 1978

CPO Gatooma.

PA which had opened in 1959 at a mission located in the Ngezi TTL about 15m E of Featherstone, some 50m SW of Salisbury.

The PA closed following intimidation. The school also had to close.

The PA reopened in March or April 1979. See page 80.

Postmark type 13 dated 16 NOV 1961.



NEMANGWE* Closed 28 MAR 1978

CPO Gokwe.

PA (probably at a growth point) in the N of Gokwe TTL which had opened in 1972

It closed due to the security situation following numerous burglaries in the premises.

Postmark type 21J-1 dated 19 OCT 77.



GWESELA* Closed 4 APR 1978

CPO Que Que.

PA which had opened in February 1975 at Chief's Hall, 2m N of Zhombe Mission about 34 miles N of Que Que.

Closed when the agency clerk absconded after being intimidated by guerrilla forces. No replacement could be recruited to replace him.

Postmark type 19 dated 19 OCT 1977.



LOCHINVAR Closed 29 APR 1978

CPO Salisbury.

MTO which opened in 1951 to service the residential suburb W of Salisbury administered by Rhodesia Railways. Large railways marshalling yards.

The office was closed when the railways sold off the area and no longer subsidised the residents/employees. Services were available from other nearby post offices.

Postmark type 13mS dated 10 MAY 1977.



WOODVILLE Closed 29 APR 1978

CPO Bulawayo.

PTA which opened in 1954 to service the residential suburb E of Bulawayo.

Probably closed due to falling demand for postal services leading to a loss reduction decision.



DARAMOMBE* Closed 7 JUN 1978

CPO Enkeldoorn.

PA which had opened in 1954 to service a village and mission station in the Charter District 31 E of Enkeldoorn.

Closed when the mission was abandoned after guerrillas forced mission staff and pupils to vacate the building from where the agency operated. Postmark type 13<u>S</u> dated 9 NOV 1977.



CHENJIRI* Closed 16 JUL 1978

CPO Hartley.

This agency had closed in September 1977 due to guerrilla activity but had re-opened nearly a year later on 8 MAY 1978. After only two months it was forced close once again when the building accommodating the agency was destroyed by fire.

Postmark type 21 dated 18 MAY 78.



MUTAMBARA Closed 31 JUL 1978

CPO Umtali.

PTA that opened in1929 in a village comprising a mission station and administrative centre 37m S of Umtali and 7m W of Cashel.

Closure was directly due to the security situation. The army was clearing out staff and administrations from various missions all along the eastern border, either because of suspected support for the nationalists or because of the need to guard these communities.

Postmark type 19 dated 21 OCT 1977.



WEDZA* Incident only 8 AUG 1978

CPO Wedza.

Wedza is a village 30m S of Marandellas, a trading and administrative centre for a region of tobacco and mixed farming.

The Postmaster's residence was slightly damaged when guerrillas attacked the village.

Postmark type 19 dated 28 AUG 1978, shortly after the attack.




HAMA* Closed 3 SEP 1978

CPO Umvuma.

PA which had opened in July 1975 at a Catholic mission founded in 1914, located about 19m NW of Fort Victoria off the main road to Umvuma.

Closed following a guerrilla attack.

Postmark type 19 dated 25 OCT 1977.



UMTALI* Incident only on 7 SEP 1978

Lying only a few miles from the Mozambique border, the city was very exposed to guerrilla activity.

A window was broken in the Umtali post office during a mortar attack on the city. No staff were injured and services were not interrupted. Postmark type 16J-5S dated 26 SEP 78, shortly after the attack.



ANTELOPE MINE* Closed 3 NOV 1978

CPO Bulawayo.

A gold mine 63m S of Bulawayo. An agency was opened here in 1909, upgraded to MTO in 1944. This was the only full post office forced to close as a direct consequence of guerrilla activities during the Bush War. Closed after the building and contents were set alight by guerrillas. Postmark type 16S dated 18 JUN 77.



CHIBUWE Closed 14 DEC 1978

CPO Chipinga.

PTA that opened in 1964 in a small community centre on the Sabi River at the junction with the Turiwi River, 40m S of Birchenough Bridge and about 13m SW of Mt. Selinda.

Like Mutambara above, this isolated rural PTA was closed due to the security situation along the eastern border. The army was clearing out staff and administrations from various missions all along the eastern border, either because of suspected support for the nationalists or because of the need to quard these communities.

Postmark type 21 dated 19 OCT 1977.



LONELY MINE Closed 29 DEC 1978

CPO Bulawayo

PA on a gold mine 51 miles N of Bulawayo that had opened in 1911 which was served by the Railway Motor Service. The agency closed when the mine closed down on 29 DEC 1978.

Postmark type 13.3 dated 19 OCT 1977.



UZUMBA* Closed 21 FEB 1979

CPO Mrewa.

PA (probably at a growth point) in the Uzumba Tribal Trust Land NW of Mrewa and due E. of Shamva which opened in 1969.

The agency closed when the council offices housing the agency were abandoned following intimidation.

Postmark type 21 dated 19 OCT 77.



MONDORO* Closed 10 MAR 1979

CPO Hartley.

PA which opened in 1949 on a mission station in the Mondoro TTL 31m SE of Hartley on a secondary road to Beatrice.

Closed when the agency clerk was abducted and presumed killed. No replacement was available.

Postmark type 21 dated 19 OCT 77.



SADZA* Closed 10 MAR 1979

CPO Enkeldoorn.

PA that opened in 1969 at a growth point between Featherstone and Kwenda, 28m NE of Enkeldoorn.

Closed when guerrilla activity in the area increased and the agent's truck, which was also used to transport the mail, hit a landmine killing the driver. Postmark type 19n dated 11 NOV 1977 (a public holiday).



RENJE* Closed 20 MAR 1979

CPO Salisbury.

PA that opened in July 1970 at a mission station and hospital 60m N of Gatooma. Closed when the building housing the agency was attacked and contents burnt. Employees were warned to vacate the area or be killed if they continued working. Postmark type 19q dated 2 MAR 1979.



SOTE SORCE Closed 31 MAY 1979

CPO Fort Victoria.

The agency opened as SOTI SORCE in 1939 but was renamed SOTE SORCE in 1964.

A farming and trading centre on a farm of the same name, 30 miles SE of Enkeldoorn off the road between Gutu and Buhera, a remote rural location. Closure was probably due to the general security situation in the area.

Postmark type 16S dated 25 SEP 76.



MASHOKO* Closed 9 AUG 1979

CPO Fort Victoria.

PA that opened in 1967 at a mission station in the Bikita area 65m SE of Fort Victoria.

Closed due to the intimidation of the agency clerk but reopened three months later.

Postmark type 21J-1 dated 31 MAY 77.



BASERA* Closed 30 AUG 1979

CPO Fort Victoria.

PA opened in December 1962 at a business centre in the GUTU District on the border with the Buhera District, 29m E of the Zimbabwe Ruins.

Closed at the request of the BSA Police because of the security situation – the road was mined and ambushed by guerrillas.

Postmark type 13nS dated 5 MAR 1979.



BEVERLEY Closed 29 SEP 1979

CPO Salisbury.

PTA that opened in 1964 in a store off the Umtali Road adjacent to the Beverley Industrial Sites E of Salisbury.

The agency was replaced by AMBY which opened 1 OCT 1979.

Postmark type 19R dated 27 APR 1979.



ZAKA* Incident only 11 OCT 1979

CPO Fort Victoria.

PTA at an administrative centre 54m SE of Fort Victoria.

Three PTC staff houses were damaged during a mortar attack on the village. No staff were injured.

Postmark type 16SR dated 14 APR 80



ST MARY'S Closed 16 APR 1980

CPO Salisbury

PA that opened in 1971 in a high density township S of Harari. The huge city of Chitungwiza was developed in 1978 by the amalgamation of the Seki, St Mary's and Zengeza townships.

Postmark type 19 dated 28 FEB 1979.

Although the name of the township is spelt using an apostrophe, the postmark does not use one.

Rhodesian Mail During the Bush War 1973 to 1980 ANNEXURES

The Annexures

Annexure 1

List of Active Rhodesian Post Offices at 1 January 1973

AMAVENI EMPRESS MINE
ANTELOPE MINE ENKELDOORN
ARCTURUS ESSEXVALE

ASCOT FAMONA BULAWAYO
AVONDALE FEATHERSTONE
BALLA BALLA FIGTREE

BANKET
BANKET
BASERA
BEATRICE
BEIT BRIDGE
BELINGWE
BELMONT-BULAWAYO
FIGHE
FIGHE
FIGHE
FIGHE
FIGHE
FORT RIXON
FORT VICTORIA
GATH'S MINE
GATOOMA
GAWA-KARIBA

BELINGWE
BELMONT-BULAWAYO
BELVEDERE
BEMBESI
BEVERLEY
BIKITA
BELVEDERE
BIKITA
GOLDEN VALLEY
GATOOMA
GAWA-KARIBA
GLENCLOVA
GLENDALE
GLENVILLE
GOLDEN VALLEY

BINDURA GOLDEN VALLEY
BINGA GOROMONZI
BINGALE GREENDALE

BIRCHENOUGH BRIDGE GUTU
BONDA GWAAI
BORROWDALE GWANDA
BRADFIELD GWANGWADZA

BROMLEY
BUFFALO RANGE
HARARI
BUHERA
HARTLEY
BULAWAYO
CASHEL
CAUSEWAY
HIGHFIELD
CENTENARY
GWELO
HARARI
HARARI
HARTLEY
HARTLEY
HEADLANDS
HIGHFIELD
HIGHLANDS

CHAKARI HILLSIDE
CHATSWORTH HONDE
CHENJIRI HUNTERS ROAD
CHIBI

CHIBUWE INYAZURA
CHIKATO JULIASDALE
CHIKWANDA KAMATIVI

CHINOYI KAMBANI-WANKIE CHIPINGA KAMBUZUMA

CHIREDZI KARIBA
CHIRUNDU KAROI
CHISIPITE KEZI
COLLEEN BAWN KOPJE
CONCESSION LALAPANZI

CRAIGMORE LLEWELLIN BARRACKS
CRANBORNE LOCHINVAR

DADAYA LONELY MINE
DARAMOMBE LOWER GWELO

DARWENDALE
DETT
LUVEVE
EASTLEA
EIFFEL FLATS
EMERALD HILL
LUPANE
LUVEVE
MABELREIGN
MABIKWA
MABVUKU

Annexure 1 continued List of Active Rhodesian Post Offices at 1 January 1973

MACHEKE MADUMABISA MAHUSEKWA MAKARARA

MAKWIRO MAMINA

MANGULA MARANDELLAS

MARLBOROUGH

MARULA MASHABA MASHOKO

MATOPOS SOUTH

MAZOE
MELFORT
MELSETTER
MKOBA
MONDORO
MONOMOTAPA
MORGENSTER
MORNINGSIDE
MOUNT DARWIN
MOUNT PLEASANT
MOUNT SELINDA
MPOPOMA-BULAWAYO

MREWA MTOKO

MTOROSHANGA MUFAKOSE MURIEL MINE MUTAMBARA MZILIKAZI NEMANGWE

NKAI

NORTHEND BULAWAYO

NORTON NUANETSI

NYAMANDHLOVU

NYANYADZI

ODZI

PENHALONGA PLUMTREE PUMULA

QUE QUE QUEENS MINE QUEENS PARK RAFFINGORA

RAYLTON REDCLIFF RENJE RIMUKA RUNIVILLE

RUSAPE

RUSITU RUWA SADZA

SAKUBVA UMTALI

SALISBURY

SALISBURY AIRPORT

SANYATWE

SAUERSTOWNSHIP

SAWMILLS
SELOUS
SELUKWE
SENKA
SHABANI
SHAMVA
SHANGANI
SINOIA
SIPOLILO
SOMABULA
SOTE SOURCE
SOUTHERTON
ST MARY'S

TAFARA
TENGWE
TJOLOTJO
TORWOOD
TRELAWNEY
TRIANGLE
TROUTBECK
TSHABALALA
TURK MINE
UMNIATI
UMTALI
UMVUKWES

UNION AVENUE SALISBURY

UZUMBA VENGERE

UMVUMA

VICTORIA FALLS

VICTORY AVENUE UMTALI

WANKIE WATERFALLS

WATERFORD-BULAWAYO

WATERLOO WATSOMBA WEDZA WELLESLEY

WEST NICHOLSON WESTEND BULAWAYO

WIDDECOMBE

WILTON WOODVILLE ZAKA

Annexure 2 Post Offices Opened and Closed Listed in Chronological Order

Office	Date	Action
	<u>1973 TO 1976</u>	
PAULINGTON	02 January 1973	OPENED
KAMBUZUMA	27 April 1973	CLOSED
HOWARD	01 August 1973	OPENED
BELLEVUE	24 November 1973	REOPENED
VENGERE	28 February 1974	CLOSED
PADDONHURST	01 May 1974	OPENED
SAUERSTOWNSHIP	31 July 1974	CLOSED
ATHLONE	01 August 1974	OPENED
WATERFORD-BULAWAYO	16 September 1974	CLOSED
PADDONHURST	01 October 1974	CLOSED
GWESELA	03 February 1975	OPENED
VICTORY AVENUE UMTALI	3 May 1975	CLOSED
KANA	02 June 1975	OPENED
HAMA	01 July 1975	OPENED
GATH'S MINE	31 July 1975	CLOSED
BRADFIELD	30 September 1975	CLOSED
WATERFORD-BULAWAYO	01 March 1976	REOPENED
MABIKWA	16 March 1976	CLOSED
BORDERVALE	31 March 1976	CLOSED
EASTLEA	01 September 1976	CLOSED
BONDA*	30 September 1976	CLOSED
CHIRUNDU	30 September 1976	CLOSED
MAKARARA*	08 October 1976	CLOSED
ALASKA MINE	25 October 1976	OPENED
GWANGWADZA*	26 October 1976	CLOSED
BINGALE	25 November 1976	CLOSED
WELLESLEY	01 December 1976	CLOSED
	<u>1977 TO 1979</u>	
CHIKWANDA*	06 January 1977	CLOSED
MUPANDAWANA	01 February 1977	OPENED
HONDE*	25 March 1977	CLOSED
BEMBESI	31 March 1977	CLOSED
MADZIWA	06 June 1977	OPENED
WATSOMBA*	21 June 1977	CLOSED
KANA*	19 August 1977	CLOSED
GWAAI*	31 August 1977	CLOSED
CHENJIRI*	05 September 1977	CLOSED
RUSITU*	01 October 1977	CLOSED
CHINOYI	01 December 1977	CLOSED

Annexure 2 continued Post Offices Opened and Closed Listed in Chronological Order

Office	Date	Action
	1977 TO 1979 continued	
BIRCHENOUGH BRIDGE	02 December 1977	CLOSED
LOWER GWELO*	31 December 1977	CLOSED
WILTON*	13 January 1978	INCIDENT
SANYATI	01 February 1978	OPENED
MSENGEZI*	05 February 1978	CLOSED
SALISBURY*	04 March 1978	INCIDENT
MAMINA*	20 March 1978	CLOSED
NEMANGWE*	28 March 1978	CLOSED
MAGWEGWE	03 April 1978	OPENED
GWESELA*	04 April 1978	CLOSED
LOCHINVAR	29 April 1978	CLOSED
WOODVILLE	29 April 1978	CLOSED
GLEN NORA	01 May 1978	OPENED
CHENJIRI	08 May 1978	REOPENED
DARAMOMBE*	07 June 1978	CLOSED
CHENJIRI*	16 July 1978	CLOSED
MUTAMBARA	31 July 1978	CLOSED
WEDZA*	08 August 1978	INCIDENT
HAMA*	03 September 1978	CLOSED
UMTALI*	07 September 1978	INCIDENT
RUSHINGA	01 October 1978	OPENED
GWAAI	02 October 1978	REOPENED
ANTELOPE MINE *	03 November 1978	CLOSED
CHIBUWE	14 December 1978	CLOSED
LONELY MINE	29 December 1978	CLOSED
UZUMBA*	21 February 1979	CLOSED
MONDORO*	10 March 1979	CLOSED
SADZA*	10 March 1979	CLOSED
RENJE*	20 March 1979	CLOSED
MAMINA	02 April 1979	REOPENED
SOTE SAUCE	31 May 1979	CLOSED
MASHOKO*	09 August 1979	CLOSED
BASERA*	30 August 1979	CLOSED
BEVERLEY	29 September 1979	CLOSED
AMBY	01 October 1979	OPENED
ZAKA*	11 October 1979	INCIDENT
MASHOKO	02 November 1979	REOPENED
ST MARY'S * Offices marked with an asterisk are the	16 April 1980 ose listed in the letter from the Postma	CLOSED ster General

^{*} Offices marked with an asterisk are those listed in the letter from the Postmaster General addessed to Chris Munnion, described in Reference 1 on page iv.

Annexure 3 Post Offices Opened and Closed Listed in Alphabetical Order

Office	Date	Action
ALASKA MINE	25 October 1976	OPENED
AMBY	01 October 1979	OPENED
ANTELOPE MINE *	03 November 1978	CLOSED
ATHLONE	01 August 1974	OPENED
BASERA*	30 August 1979	CLOSED
BELLEVUE	24 November 1973	REOPENED
BEMBESI	31 March 1977	CLOSED
BEVERLEY	29 September 1979	CLOSED
BINGALE	25 November 1976	CLOSED
BIRCHENOUGH BRIDGE	02 December 1977	CLOSED
BONDA*	30 September 1976	CLOSED
BORDERVALE	31 March 1976	CLOSED
BRADFIELD	30 September 1975	CLOSED
CHENJIRI*	05 September 1977	CLOSED
CHENJIRI	08 May 1978	REOPENED
CHENJIRI*	16 July 1978	CLOSED
CHIBUWE	14 December 1978	CLOSED
CHIKWANDA*	06 January 1977	CLOSED
CHINOYI	01 December 1977	CLOSED
CHIRUNDU	30 September 1976	CLOSED
DARAMOMBE*	07 June 1978	CLOSED
EASTLEA	01 September 1976	CLOSED
GATH'S MINE	31 July 1975	CLOSED
GLEN NORA	01 May 1978	OPENED
GWAAI*	31 August 1977	CLOSED
GWAAI	02 October 1978	REOPENED
GWANGWADZA*	26 October 1976	CLOSED
GWESELA	03 February 1975	OPENED
GWESELA*	04 April 1978	CLOSED
HAMA	01 July 1975	OPENED
HAMA*	03 September 1978	CLOSED
HONDE*	25 March 1977	CLOSED
HOWARD	01 August 1973	OPENED
KAMBUZUMA	27 April 1973	CLOSED
KANA	02 June 1975	OPENED
KANA*	19 August 1977	CLOSED
LOCHINVAR	29 April 1978	CLOSED
LONELY MINE	29 December 1978	CLOSED
LOWER GWELO*	31 December 1977	CLOSED
MABIKWA	16 March 1976	CLOSED
MADZIWA	06 June 1977	OPENED

Annexure 3 continued Post Offices Opened and Closed Listed in Alphabetical Order

Office	Date	Action
MAGWEGWE	03 April 1978	OPENED
MAKARARA*	08 October 1976	CLOSED
MAMINA*	20 March 1978	CLOSED
MAMINA	02 April 1979	REOPENED
MASHOKO*	09 August 1979	CLOSED
MASHOKO	02 November 1979	REOPENED
MONDORO*	10 March 1979	CLOSED
MSENGEZI*	05 February 1978	CLOSED
MUPANDAWANA	01 February 1977	OPENED
MUTAMBARA	31 July 1978	CLOSED
NEMANGWE*	28 March 1978	CLOSED
PADDONHURST	01 May 1974	OPENED
PADDONHURST	01 October 1974	CLOSED
PAULINGTON	02 January 1973	OPENED
RENJE*	20 March 1979	CLOSED
RUSHINGA	01 October 1978	OPENED
RUSITU*	01 October 1977	CLOSED
SADZA*	10 March 1979	CLOSED
ST MARY'S	16 April 1980	CLOSED
SALISBURY*	04 March 1978	INCIDENT
SANYATI	01 February 1978	OPENED
SAUERSTOWNSHIP	31 July 1974	CLOSED
SOTE SAUCE	31 May 1979	CLOSED
UMTALI*	07 September 1978	INCIDENT
UZUMBA*	21 February 1979	CLOSED
VENGERE	28 February 1974	CLOSED
VICTORY AVENUE UMTALI	3 May 1975	CLOSED
WATERFORD-BULAWAYO	16 September 1974	CLOSED
WATERFORD-BULAWAYO	01 March 1976	REOPENED
WATSOMBA*	21 June 1977	CLOSED
WEDZA*	`08 August 1978	INCIDENT
WELLESLEY	01 December 1976	CLOSED
WILTON*	13 January 1978	INCIDENT
WOODVILLE	29 April 1978	CLOSED
ZAKA*	11 October 1979	INCIDENT

^{*} Offices marked with an asterisk are those listed in the letter from the Postmaster General addessed to Chris Munnion, described in Reference 1 on page iv.